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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Relevance and Purpose of the Study 
The cost of hospital care has become an item of intense 
interest to both producers·and consumers of this amalgam of 
goods and servicesc Of special interest (and distress) to 
consumers has been the rather substantial inflation in hos-
pital costs in recent yearso 1 If the term ''inflation" can 
be applied to nonmonetary phenomenaf there has been a rather 
substantial "inflation" in the economic·literature regarding, 
hospital costs and the·mechanisms that cause inflation in 
this industryo Investigations of the demand for and the cost 
of hospital care and other medical inputs "filled a number 
of professional journals and provided grist for the mills of 
a large number of graduate students in the process of grind-
ing out Ph.Do dissertations. 112 In spite of such literary 
1While prices may or may not be representative of 
"costs'·' in the medical care, industry, an inspection of· the 
August, 1973, issue of the Monthly Labor Review shows that 
price index calculations place hospital room charges at 
181. 4 percent of the 1967 base priceo The index further 
reveals that medical care prices in general are only 13700 
per¢ent· of 1967 levels against the index for all consumer 
goods and services of 132.4 perc~nt of 1967 base. 
2Ryland A. Taylor, "Principles of the Economic Behavior 
of Hospitals," Nebraska Journal of Economics and Business, 
XI (Spring, 1972) up. 45. 
l 
inflationo little if any of this literature deals with the 
subject of this dissertation, the effect of competition on 
h0spital costso 
The purpose of this study is to test the hypothesis: 
2 
"More intense competition in the hospital industry results 
in higher 11 .. rather than lower average costs.," The usual 
assumption that competition among sellers results in lower 
costs cannot be applied uncritically to the,hospital 
industry. It is shown below that the customs and institu-
tions peculiar to the·medical care industry's production and 
distribution processes have. led to some confused and pos-
sibly incorrect conclusions regarding the market performance 
of this industry and its components. 
Plan and Scope of the Study 
The second chapter of the study includes an examination 
of the literature that is relevant to the purposes of the 
studyo The chapter draws on that literature to develop the 
theoretical framework for the study and introduces the set 
of assumptions from which the study's analysis proceeds. 
The third chapter introduces the "model" that is employed in 
the empirical analysis of the data. The formulation of the 
appropriate variables and the statement of the analytical 
model dominates this chapter. The fourth chapter discusses 
the statistical and other techniques that are the "meth0d-
0logy ef,analysis" in the study. The fifth chapter presents 
the results of the empirical analysis. There are included 
the results of several alternative approaches to the 
statistical problems involved. The sixth. and concluding 
chapter of the study discusses the implications of the 
analytical results and compares them with the hypothesis 
and the purpose of the study. 
3 
The scope of the study is subject to a budget 
constraint.and is, therefere,. restricted to an examination 
of.the hospital industry in the state of Oklahomao Conse-
quently, the results. of this study cannot be uncritically 
abstracted to the nation as a whole or even to other states. 
Nevertheless, it is desirable that these results be sub-
jected to tests for verification or refutation by other 
investigators or by this writer as is customary in economics 
and in other scholarly disciplines. 
CHAPTER II 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY 
Intr0ducti0n 
This chapter presents·a brief review·of the literature 
pertaining to the central hypothesis of this study and 0ut-
lines the theoretical feundaticms frem which the analysis 
can proceedo First, there is a discussion 0f the productien 
processes involved in the medical care·industry. Then, the 
viewpoint is develeped that the physician, rather than the 
patient, is the "buyer".or demander of hespital services. 
There is included some discussion of the expected respense 
ef hespitals te their physician-customerso The third sec-
tien reviews the literature that speaks to the,measurement 
of hespital cost behavi0r and te the determination ef its 
causes. The feurth section explores those writings that 
bear directly on the study's hyp0thesi~ that more intense· 
c0mpetition results in higher average casts: the structure 
of markets in which hespitals produce and the behavier ef 
hespitals in those different market structures. In the 
fifth sectien, the role of insurance in the demand for 
medical care is explored. The eccm0mic·behavior ef a con ... 
sumer with and witheut insurance ceverage of h0spital 
expenses is consideredo Finally, there is a discussion ef 
4 
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the implications of the presence or absence of the profit or 
property rights incentive as such situations might apply to 
the main focus of this studyo 
This chapter is not intended to be an exhaustive 
exploration of the writings that might be classified under 
the heading·of any one ef the sections of the chapter. 
Rather 8 it is intended to be a review of those writings and 
the development of those areas of.economic;theery that 
clearly address the subject matter of this dissertation. 
The Production of Medical Care 
It is quite difficult to conceptualize the amalgam of 
I 
goods and services often referred to as "medical care" as a 
"final produced product." Such conceptualization becomes·a 
bit easier if a term is borrowed from the medical profession 
and used to describe "final produced producto" The term is 
"therapy." A physician organizes his own resources in cen-
cert with othe.r medical inputs such as prescribed drugs and 
hospital care to produce "therapies" for his patient-
customers. The usual organization of the American medical 
care,industry places the physician in private practice as 
the entrepreneur or the relevant firm that directs produc-
tion. This particular organizatio·nal pattern is not general 
throughout the medical care industry in other c0untries er 
even in the United States itself. For example, in Health 
Maintenance Organizations such as the Kaiser-Permanente 
Groups, the physician is a de facto employee·rather than 
6 
being in private practice. 1 Even in these kinds of. 
organizatiens6 the physician, is in the dominant positi0n as 
to the selection of the mix of medical inputs that is 
employed to produce therapies for his patients. It is 
assumed in this study that the more usual organizational 
pattern prevails, i.e., where the physician is the entre-
preneur. This is, in fact, the most reasonable assumption 
to make for a study limited to hospitals in the state of 
Oklahomao 
P~ysicians as Custemers of Hospitals 
Hospital care is viewed in this study as an intermediate 
product used at times in the production of the final geed, 
medical care or "therapy"" The physician is viewed as the 
entrepreneur or, at least 0 as the "agent" for patients in 
organizing production. There is little problem in accepting 
the notion that th,e physician organizes and selects the vari~ 
ous medical goods and services (including hospital care} that 
might be usea to preduce·medical care·or therapies for his 
patient-customers" There may be, however, some problem 
associated with the other viewpeint that physicians, rather 
than their patients;. are considered by hospitals to be their 
custemerso The problem arises out of the conventions and 
institutions surrounding the way hospital charges are 
usually paid; the patient or his insurance carriers 8 not his 
1sidney Ra Garfield, "The Delivery of Medical Care," 
Scientific American u· CCXXII·· {April, 19 70) , pp. l;,-23" 
physician 0 pay hospital charges. Uncritical acceptance of 
this seller-buyer relationship between hospitals and 
patients may be misleading regarding the economic character 
of the total·· transaction. 
The actual involvement of the patient in paying for 
intermediate products should not obscure the economic rela-
7 
tionship between the patient and his physician; the patient-
customer is buying medical care, from the physician-seller 
and not buying hospital care; drugs 0 .and physician's ser-
vices separately. It is this dichotomized payments mechanism 
that has obscured the underlying economics of the total 
transaction between the patient and the physician. 
If this dichotomized payments mechanism existed in, 
say, the automobile repair industry, a customer might buy 
automobile repair but make individual payments to the·ser-
vice·manager for diagnosis, to the mechanic for laber, and 
to the parts department for materials. The medical care 
industry has been likened to the constructi0n industry where 
the physician might be a general contractor and hospitals, 
pharmacies, lab0ratories 6 and such might be subcontractorse 
The purchaser might well make a single payment to the gen-
eral contractor or individual payments to the subcontract0rs 
depending on such factors as the financial strengtp of the 
general contractor. 2 Physicians may or may not own and 
contrel lab0ratoriesu X-ray equipment, and other inputs te 
2Robert Go Rice 6 II Analysis of the Hespi tal as an 
Economic Organism 0 11 M0dern Hospital, CVI (April, 1966), p. 90. 
8 
the medical care industry as many general contractors may er 
may net own and control heavy equipment, lumber yards, and 
other inputs to the construction industry. 
The dichotomized payments mechanism where the origin of 
the demand for hospital care (physicians) is not the same as 
the origin of payments for hespital care {patients) may be 
the source of further inefficiency in the allocation of 
resources to the hospital sector; such dichotomization sepa-
rates the business organizations of the physicians' practices 
of medicine from consideration of the costs of alternative 
medical g0ods and services mixes in the selection of least-
cost combinations in producing therapieso 
E. Mo Kaitz, in his study of the Massachusetts' hospital 
industry, did net explicitly state that the physician was the 
hospitai's customero He did, however, state that the hospi-
tal responded to the physician as if he was, indeed, the 
customer: "In 0rder to maintain the good will of • • • 
[physicians], the hospital must be prepared to respond to at 
least some of their demands fer facilities and services. 113 
In an early work (1965)u H. E. Klarman acknowledged the 
dominant role played by physicians in selecting and organiz-
·ing medical inputs f0r preduction. "Once the patient 
decides to seek help, it is the physician whe prescribes the 
other goods and services. such as drugs and hospital care, 
3Edward M. Kaitzu Pricini Policy and Cest Behavior in 
the Hespital Industry (New Y0rk, 1968), p. 780 
9 
that should supplement or replace his own services. 114 While 
this particular work ranged widely over many health-related 
fields, Klarman did devote considerable effort to an exami-
nation of the physician-hospital relationship in the produc-
tion of medical careo 5 
An early explicit statement 0f the view that the 
physician is the hospital's customer is found, in a 1966 
article by R. G. Rice. 6 Rice viewed hospitals as pr0ducers 
of the productu hospital care 
o •• which is itself an input in the production 
of the final product for which a true consumer 
demand exists, and o . ·• this final product may 
be described as "medical care" o • o • That the 
true consumer demand is for "medical care" rather 
than its components is hardly a novel idea.? 
Rice pointed out that there were early examples in the 
history of the medical care industry in this country where 
the physician actually purchased hospital services for use 
in his private practice of medicine. 8 While Rice's intent 
was not to establish that the physician was the hospital's 
de facto- customer, this was a significant conclusion as it 
might apply to this studyo 
Other writers have eschewed Rice's model and held the 
mere ebvious but trivial view·that the act ef exchapge 
4Herbert E. Klarman, The Economics of Health (New York, 
1965) , p. 15. 
5Ibidog PPo ·131-360 
6Rice, pp. 87~91. 
7Ibido 
8Ibid. 
10 
defines the buyer-seller relationship between patients and 
hospitals. In a 1970 article, M. Brown, Jr. 1 while receg-
nizing that the patient's decisions regarding hospital care 
were in fact his physician's decisions 8 took issue with the 
view that the physician was the hospital's customer: "[T]he 
economic. fact that the censumer-patient pays for and con-
sumes [hospital] services should be perfectly clearo" 9 
Brown then commented on arguments by Rice and others: 
Some writers have made the argument that the 
medical staff physicians are the real customers 
of the hospital. This is difficult to justify, 
unless one can make the argument that the hes-
pital sells to the·physician the service of 
making facilities available for him to treat 
his patientso And this might not be such a bad 
argument.10 
Nevertheless, the notion that the physician is the hospital's 
customer (or at·least the origin of demand for hospital 
care) is a view·that finds substantial support in the litera-
ture. Thereforeu it is a basic assumption for the analysis 
in this study. 
Hospital Cost Behavior: Its 
Measurement and Causes 
At this point it might be well to raise the issue of 
using "costs" rather than "prices" in the empirical section 
of this studyo The price data that are available on a 
9Max Brown, .. Jr., "An Econemic Analysis of Hospital 
Operations," Hospital Administration, XV(Spring 1 1970), 
p. 65. -
lOibid~ 
11 
h0spital-by-hospital basis are prices charged by hospitals 
for basic semiprivate accommodations and these prices charged 
fer a few of the more popular ancillary itemso Such prices 
are not very useful unless one also has available the par-
ticular use-rates of the ancillary items by the·"usual" 
patiento These data are not available on a hospital-by-
hospital basiso Because of the general nonprofit·erganiza-
tion of haspitals, it has been said that "costs' are really 
"prices" in this industryo 11 M. S. Feldstein felt that 
total expenditure data we~e superior to the price data 
because all patient care expenditures were included incest 
series that were not so included in any price series for the 
hospital industry. 12 In defending his use ef "costs" rather 
than "prices" in his study ef. inflatic:m in the hespi tal 
industryf Feldstein said: "The 1 ave+age daily service 
charge 0 which is used as the hospital cemponent of the con-
sumer price index is both conceptually inferior [te avail-
able cest·series] and not available for individual states 
[or individual hespitals]. 1113 
11Joseph D. Newheusep "Toward a Theory of Nonprefit 
Institutiens: An Economic Medel of ·a Hospital," .American 
Ecenemic ReviewQ LX (May, 1970), p. 67. 
12Martin s. Feldstein, "Hospital Cost Inflation: A 
Study ef Nenprofit,Price Dynamics," American EcenGmicReview, 
LXI (December, 1971), p. 859. See especially note 22w ibido 
13Ibid. 
Kc Davis took issue with the notion that "costs" are 
equivalent to "prices" in the hospital industry. 14 The 
12 
results of her study indicated that in time periods before 
1969, there was little basis for the conclusion that prices 
were equivalent to or were some simple transformation ef 
costs. However, for the year 1969, the last year included 
in Davis' study, her results furnish substantial support for 
the equivalency of costs and prices in the hospital indus-
try.15 Given some degree of equivalency between costs and 
prices in this industry, the consumer price index series can 
be a valuable measure of hospital cost behavior. Addition-
ally, annual issues of the American Hospital Association 
Guide to the Health~ F~eld detail enough total cost and 
other relevant data to allow abstraction of an adequate 
average cost-series. Another measure of hospital price 
(cest) behavior is· found in what has become an annual fea-
ture in the Social Security Bulletin., Under the title of 
"National Health Expenditures, 1929-71," De P. Rice and 
Be Sc Cooper have discussed the equivalencyof costs and 
prices in the hospital industryc They noted that the rates 
of growth of these measures have been both quite high and 
14Karen Davis, "Relationship of Hospital Prices to 
Costs," Applied Economics, IV (1971), pp. 115-250 
15rbidc Davis tested the constancy of the ratio of 
semiprivate room charges (prices} te average t0tal costs" 
Only in 1969 did she find that the coefficients of other 
independent variables includeq in her model were not dif-
ferent from zeroc Additionally, the values of R2 were 
smaller in later years in all ·models· indicating random 
rather than predictable variations in the ratios of prices 
to costs in later years (1965 and 1969) c Pp. 118-23. 
13 
quite similar. 16 Rice and Cooper's·measures do not, however, 
show area-by-area or state-by-state differences in either 
cost or price changeso 
The .causes of cost and price increases in the·hospital 
industry that are cited in the literature are held to be any 
or all of those events and factors that tend to cause higher 
costs and prices in any industryo Some writers cite 
increased demand for hospital care resulting from higher 
incomes·or a shift in preferences teward professional health 
care, or resulting from an effective reduction in the price 
of hospital ca::re perceived by insured patientso Others make 
reference to increased labor costs and a general increase in 
the prices of hospital inputs. There is a whole new litera-
ture emerging:regarding·the adverse effects of the lack 0f 
the profit incentive. There is also a general recognition 
that the satisfaction of physician wants puts upward pres-
sure on costs and prices in this industry. Rapid develop-
ment and implementaticm of new medical technologies is given 
as another cause of cost and price increases in the hospital 
sector. A fairly complete discussion of the cause~ of hos-
pital cost increases is included in M. s. Feldstein's 
article. 17 Further citation and discussion here wquld 
appear to b.e a rather sterile exercise. It is interesting 
1600rothy P. Rice and Barbara S. Cooper~ "National 
Health Expenditures, 1929-71," Soc!al Security Bulletin, 
XXXV (January, 1972), p. 4. 
l?Ma S. Feldstein, pp. 853-54. 
14 
to note, however, that the presence or absence of competition 
in the hospital industry is seldom even mentioned in the 
literature, let alone cited as a cause of cost or price 
increases. 
The Structure of Markets for Hospital 
Care and the Market Performance 
of Hospitals 
It was stated above that there is little mention of the 
structure of markets in the literature pertaining to the 
hospital industryo It appears that the institutional non-
profit organization and the benevolent goals of this 
industry have discouraged investigators who might otherwise 
have been interested in the effects of monopolized and com-
petitive hospital care markets. 18 
The purpose of this study as implied earlier is to 
examine and to test the role that market structures play in 
the hospital cost inflationary mechanism. It is apparent 
that an analysis of the production processes in the medical 
care industry showing that hospitals are producers of inter-
mediate rather than final medical goods·and services dees 
little to explain hospital cost behaviora However, an under-
standing 0f the response of hospitals te meet the wants of 
their physician-customers within the peculiar institutional 
18such a statement is, of course, a judgment by this 
writer and is based on both his evaluation of the literature 
included here and on his evaluatien of other werkso 
15 
setting of the medical care industry will lead to 
economically predictable responses in hospital costs and an 
understanding of the inflationary mechanism that might not 
be forthcoming if a more usual view of the production pro-
cesses and market relationships is•heldo 
The hypothesis to be tested in this study •tates that 
more intense competition in the hospital industry results in 
higher average costs. In this sense, the "degree or inten-
sity of competition" is a measure of the structure 0f markets 
for hospital careo The term "degree er intensity of compe-
tition" needs explicit definition in the way it will be used 
in the studyo Hospitals "compete" for the revenue-producing 
powers of the physician populationo If there is a single 
hospital in a market area, the hospital is a monopolist and 
the physician population must acquire the hospital care 
desired to produce therapies for patient-customers from a 
single seller of this medical inputo If, however, there are 
several h0spitals in a market area (a higher degree of compe-
tition), the physician population may choose among several 
sellers and select the ones that best suits its wantso 
Hospitals compete not by lowering their prices but by offer-
ing physicians the mix of hospital goods and services that 
best complement physicians 1 own resources in the production 
of medical care for their patients. 
In his study, Eo M. Kaitz did not directly approach the 
question ef the market structure where hospital care is 
sold; he did explore the differential response of isolated 
16 
or rural (monopoly) hospitals versus urban or suburban 
(competitive) hospitalso 19 The portions of Kaitz's findings 
that apply to this study were that hospital administrators 
usually responded in a positive fashion to the individual 
physician's wants regarding facili~ies, equipment, and even 
regarding brand name drugs and disposable suppliesd Kaitz 
reported that hospital administraters faced mere intense 
pressure from physicians for expanded facilities and ser-
vices in urban and suburban markets than in iselated rural 
marketso Administrators said they were able to resist the 
"unreasonable" demands of medical staff more readily if 
physicians were not. able to "shop" amcmg several hospitals 
to find ones that would best satisfy their wants (in exchangeff 
of course, for their ability t0 provide hespitals with 
revenue-producing patients) . 20 In other words, competition 
made hospitals more willing to try to satisfy the wants of 
their customers (physicians). This is exactly what ec0n0mic 
theory predictso But without accounting for the institutions 
and customs regarding the production processes and the pay-
ments mechanism in the medical care industry, the predicti0ns 
regarding cost behavior in the hospital care industry might 
be in error or might appear to be in conflict with a prin-
ciple of economics. 
19K 't a1 z, pp. 79-80 0 
20 rbid., PPo 149-56. 
17 
Mo L. Lee borrowed Veblen's terminology in describing 
the response of hospitals to physicianso He recognized that 
physicians were demanders of hospital care and described the 
response of hospitals to satisfy the wants of physicians as 
"conspicuous production." 21 Lee discussed the effects of 
competition among hospitals on their costs~ 
[C]ompetition among h0spitals for physicians results 
in expanding and improving- the-inventory of inputs 
to meet the demands of physicians, andf part of the 
expenses incurred in connection with the expansion 
and improvement of the inventory of inputs may be 
regarded as implicit payments to the-physicians--a 
price paid to attract physicianso22 
Unfortunately, Lee did not subject this observation to an 
empirical testo He hypothesized that hospitals were maxi"-
mizing "status" and that high status hospitals attracted 
physicians who would provide revenue-producing patientsa 23 
However, the behavior described by Lee is quite congruent 
with either profit maximization or output maximization 
within a break-even constraint if hospitals recognize the 
physician as their customer and respond to him appropriately 
in order to attract him and his revenue-producing patientso 
Lee's-discussion of empirical possibilities applies directly 
to the thesis of this studyo Lee was not able to test 
explicitly his hypothesis that there was more- "conspicuous 
21Mah Lin Lee 5 A Conspicuo~ Production Theory of 
Hospital Behavior, Studies in Health Care 6 Report Noa 6 
(Columfila, Mo., 1970) u Po 2o 
22 Ibida O p. 4. 
23 Ibido 
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producticm II where h0spi tals had to c0mpete for a physician 
p0pulation. He did, nevertheless; calculate a statistically 
significant correlati0n ceefficient (016) between average 
costs·ef hespitals and the number ef hospitals per thousand 
square milesc 24 Lee termed this measure of concentration a 
measure 0f "the degree of eligopolistic interdependence. 1125 
In terms used in this study, such a measure of concentration 
might be a crude measure of competitive or n0ncompetitive 
marketsu Le. 8 the structure of the markets in which h0spital 
care.is soldo· Lee's results, however tentative, lend some 
support te the central hypothesis of this studyc 
Where it is assumed that physicians are viewed as 
customers by hospitals, it would be helpful to analyze the 
theoretical consideratiens of such a relationshipo Ini-
tially0 the analysis below assumes that patients de not 0wn 
hospitalization insurance. 
In a monopoly market, a hospital would consider the 
demand fer its output, the costs of production 6 and attempt 
to maximize profits or attempt to maximize some other ebjec~ 
tive function if profits are deemed to be an inapprepriate 
maximando Revenues accrue tea hospital from charges paid 
by patients; costs accrue as a result 0f providing goods and 
services required by physicians in their private practices. 
Since hospital costs and the costs.of many other intermediate 
24 rbido 8 Pc 2L 
25Ibid. 
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medical goods and services are not viewed by the physician 
as costs within the business organization of his personal 
practice, the physician may or may not select least-cost 
combinations of inputs in producing therapies for his 
patients, even if he does select least-cost combinations of 
the inputs he owns o If the·· physician selects hospital care 
'\_ 
in such a situation when a less expensive input would be the 
more economically efficient choice 6 the demand for hospital 
care will increase, thereby increasing hospital costsa And 
he may want specialized equipment and facilities to be sup-
plied by the hospital to avoid making a personal investment 
that might result in personal·losses rather than personal 
profitso Whether er n0t these facilities and equipment 
might be "profitable" for a hospital, they will almost cer-
tainly increase costs. If the physician prescribes hospital 
care in order to use these items and facilities~ the demand 
for hospital care increases, again, increasing hospital 
costso The monopoly hospital can, however, act as a 
restraint by making its decision regarding any investment 
response to physician wants based on an.examination of the 
effects of its response on its 11 profits" (or on another 
objective fuijction) o In a more competitive market structure 
where more than one hospital competes fer the patient-
admitting powers of the physician population, those physi-
cians who organize their practices to attract patients who 
are affluent and pay their medical care bills promptly will 
be the physician-customers for whom hospitals will compete 
mest vigorouslyo If one of those physicians desires 
equipment or facilities that are not available in the com-
munity, competing hospitals may have great incentive to a 
acquire the wanted items to attract his revenue producing 
abilities. And even if the physician has the items avail-
able at a particular hespital, a competing hospital may 
acquire duplicate items in hopes of attracting him and his 
20 
"profitable" patients. There is, therefore, the possibility 
of capital redundancy and higher costs·among those hospitals 
in areas where the market structure is other than monopolis-
tico26 
However, there exists a final restraining market force 
in the form of the patient-customer's demand function for 
the final good, medical care. If hospital costs and prices 
are too high 0 the patient might well purchase less costly 
treatment in a less competitive hospital marketa Both phy-
sicians and hospitals must react by restraining costs to 
avoid such a possibility which would reduce their revenues. 
Even this final market restraint may not apply if the patient 
owns a hospitalization insurance policya 
26' Kaitz, p., 79. Alse see Newhouse, "Toward a Theery 
of Nonprofit Institutions 0 11 pp. 66-74. Newhouse·discussed 
the behavior of physicians towards hospitals and also the 
behavior of consumers who owned. hespitalization insurance. 
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The Role of Insurance in the 
Demand for Medical Care 
When an individual owns a hospitalization insurance 
policy, he perceives the price of hospital care to be zero 
or to be reduced greatly depending on the provisions of his 
particular policy. Therefore, the physician and the hospi-
tal escape,the discipline of the market response of the 
patient to high-priced hospital care. The existence of 
universal insurance coverage of hospital care will make hos-
pitals producing in'. either a monepolistic or mere competitive 
market structure feel freer to respond to their physician-
customers' wantso 
If every patient had fuil coverage cost-based 
hospital insurance, there would be no constraint 
on the amount of capital and laber that physi-
cians combine with their serviceso Capital and 
labor would therefore be employed up to the point 
at which the marginal contribution of each to the 
physician's revenue was zeroo This produces 
"Cadillac-quality" medicine. The only constraint 
on the use of these inputs would be offered by 
the upper limit on the number of things a hospi-
tal can de fer a patient which might have some 
justification. Over time, technological chan<)Je 27 
might be expected to relax even this constrainto 
Of course, n0t all consumers ewn such "full coverage cost-
• 
bas~d hospitalization insurance." But only a very small 
proportion of the population does not own some kind of 
hospitalization insuranceo Seme estimates report that only 
27Mark Pauly and Michael Redisch, "The Not For-Profit 
Hespital as a Physicians' Cooperative," American Economic 
Review, LXIII (March, 1973), p. 960 
3 or 4 percent of the persons aged 65 and over have no 
hospitalization coverage and only 12 percent of those per-
sons under age 65 have no hospitalization insurance cover-
age.28 
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The Blue Cross Association and other insurance industry 
associations compile and publish annual series that 0utline 
the distribution and structure of private health insurance 
coverage. A more complete compilation of these data-is an 
annual feature in the Social Security Bulletina 29 This 
annual study includes some information regarding the 
insurance-type public health care programs such as Medicare. 
These data summarized in the Social Security Bulletin indi-
cate that the distributien 0f some ferm of health insurance 
or insurance-type public programs has reached a surprisingly 
large proportion of the population, over 90 percent by some 
estimates. An almost universal feature of these insurance 
policies and of the public programs is some form of hospital 
care-ceverage. 30 Substantially smaller percentages of the 
pepulation (less than 50 percent) owned p0licies or haa 
benefits from public programs that covered such me~ical care 
geods,and services as treatment in their physicians' effices 
or prescribed drugs that were not administerea in :P,ospitalso 31 
28Marjerie s. Mueller, "Private Health Insurance in 
1971: Health Care Servicesu Enrollment, and Finances," 
S0cial S~curi1=X_Bulletin, XXXVI {February, 1973), Po 3. 
29 Ibid., pp~ 3-22. 
JOibicL 
31Ibid., ppo 3-7. 
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The broad distribution of medical care insurance in the 
economy and the resulting increase in demand fer medical 
goods and services is cited as contributing to increased 
costs in this industryo Similarly, the structure of medical 
care insurance coverages, ioea 6 hospital care being more 
intensely insured, contributes to increased costs,in the 
hospital sector of the industryo 
When insurance covers part of each patient's 
hospital bill, the factor prices of hospital 
inputs are effectively reduced o .. [t0 phy-
sicians]. One would expect an increase in the 
usage of hospital inputs relative to physician 
inputs for producing a given 0utput. Hospital 
unit costs would risea32 
Such an increase in demand (and costs) in the hospital 
sector might not be so apparent if hospital care was not 
such a good substitute for many other medical goods and 
serviceso 
The diagram in Figure 1 is useful to illustrate this 
phenomeneno The diagram is a consumer's preference map 
relating "hospital care" and "all other goods and services" 
and can be used to illustrate the behavior of a consumer who 
owns a hospitalization insurance pelicyc Since other medi-
cal go0ds and services, such as treatment in the physician's 
effice, are less intensively ins'Ured 6 they are included in 
"all ether goods and services" on the vertical axis of 
Figure 1. It is assumed that the consumer in question has 
received his insurance policy without personal expenditure 
32P auly and Re dis ch, po 9 6. 
Units of all 
other goods 
and services 
0 b 
care 
B 
Figure lo The Effects of Hospitalization Insurance 
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as a fringe benefit-of employment, advanced age, or poverty. 
This is not an unrealistic starting point; over 100 million 
persons in addition to a large proportion (over 80 percent) 
of the 76 million Blue Cross members pay nothing er substan-
tially less than actuarial cost for their hospitalization 
insurance through employer plans, Medicare, or Medicaido 33 
Also assume (for the sake 0f realism) that the consumer is 
subject to a small "deductible" on all insured stays in a 
hospital. This is represented by quantity 0-b on the 
"hospital care" axis in Figure 1. Curves I-IV are 
33Mueller O pp. 4-5, and Margi th Pachl, "The Use of 
Hospitals by Blue Cross Members in 1971 6 " Blue Cross Reperts, 
Research Series 10 (May, 1973)., Po 3. 
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indifference curves relating the consumer's preferences 
between hospital care and all other goods and services. 
Line A-Bis the consumer's income constrainto Point·C rep-
resents the consumer's consumption pattern before he acquired 
the hospitalization insurance policyo Line A-X-Y represents 
the consumer's income constraint after he received the 
insurance policy as a "fringe benefito" He pays market 
price fer the first "deductible" quantity of hospital care 
(0-b) and then perceives the price ef all further hospital 
care to be zero. 34 Point D represents the consumption pat-
tern of the consumer after receiving the hospitalization 
insurance policyo This particular behavior depends en hos-
pital care being almost fully insured and other substitute 
medical geeds and services b~ing less fully insured; the 
patient substitutes quite adequate "free" geods and services 
{hospital care) for "costly" alternative medical goeds and 
servicese This phenomenon is described by the insurance 
industry as "meral hazard,'·' i o e., the owner of the policy 
behaves in a "merally deficient" manner as compared to hew 
he would behave witheut the insurance policy. 
Moral,hazard refers to the tendency of those persons 
with insurance benefits for particular purchases to ccmsume 
more of the insured good or service than before those bene-
fits were available. The insurance industry and some 
34Mark v. Pauly, "The Ecenomics of Meral Hazard: 
Cemment," American Ecorn:>mic Review, LVIII (June, 1968), 
PB 535 0 
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economists consider such behavior to represent a "moral flaw" 
in human character. 35 But some writers consider such behav-
ior to be the economically rational reaction of consumers 
who perceive the prices of insured purchases to be reduced 
or even free once the consumer is entitled to insurance-type 
benefits. 36 An interesting exchange regarding these oppos-
ing views occurred between Ko J. Arrow and M. v. Pauly over 
the view taken by Arrow in his article, "Uncertainty and the 
Welfare Economics of Medical Care. 1137 Pauly took issue with 
the notion that the acquisition of insurance benefits 
increasing the quantity demanded of the insured purchases 
represented so~e moral flaw in consumers. His analysis 
demonstrated 
••. that the response of seeking more medical 
care with insurance than in its absence is a 
result not of moral perfidy, but of rational 
economic behavior. Since the cost of the indi-
vidual's excess usage is spread over all other 
purchasers of that insurance, the individual is 
not prompted to restrain his usage of care.38 
35 rn the health insurance industry it is held that such 
a "moral· flaw" extends to physicians and hospitals in that 
both must cooperate with the patient in his "scheme" to sub-
stitute insured hospital care for uninsured other medical 
goods and services. 
36Pauly, "The Economics of Moral Hazard O " p. 5 35. 
37Kenneth J. Arrow, "Uncertainty and the Welfare 
Economics of Medical Care," American Economic Review, LIII 
(December, 1963), pp. 941-73" 
38 Pauly, "The Economics of Moral Hazard," p. 535. 
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Arrow's respcmse to this particular passage of Pauly's was: 
We may agree certainly that the seeking of more 
medical care with insurance is a rational action 
on the part of the individuals if no further con-
straints are imposedo It does not follow that no 
constraints ought to be or indeed that in certain 
contexts individuals should not impose constraints 
on themselveso Mr. Pauly's wording suggests that 
"rational economic behavi0r" and "moral perfidy" 
are mutually exclusive categories. No doubt 
Judas Iscariot"turned a tidy profit from one of 
his transactions, but the usual judgment of his 
behavior is not necessarily wrong.39 
Notwithstanding judgments of "moral perfidy," the preceding 
exchange exemplifies a consensus in the literature regarding 
the effect of insurance on the demand for medical care. 
A more subtle effect on the structure of insurance 
coverage itself that results from the demand for hospital 
care has also been reported. Pauly suggested that the ten-
dency in the u. s. economy for consumers to acquire hospi-
talization insurance rather than full-coverage medical care 
insurance could be explained by assuming that consumers were 
"risk avertersa 1140 Hospital stays were more "random" 
(risky) events than other kinds of medical events and were, 
therefere, more likely to be insured by "risk averting" ccm-
sumers. The larger proportion of consumers with hespitali-
zation insurance as compared to full-coverage medical care 
insurance results in an increase in the demand for hospital 
care by insured consumers in the fashion discussed by Pauly 
39Kenneth J. Arrow, "The Economics of Moral Hazard: 
Further Comment," American Economic Reviewu LVIII (June~ 
1968), p. 5380 
40Pauly, "The Econ0mics of M0ral Hazard," p. 5340 
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in his analysis of the effects of insurance on the demand 
for medical care. 
Ho J0seph reported that in hospital stays where there 
was some degree of substitutability between hospital care 
and some other less expensive forms·of medical care,.insured 
patients tended to choose longer term hespital care as 
opposed to outpatient treatment or treatment in their phy-
sicians' offices. 41 Joseph was investigating the impact of 
the moral hazard phenomenon en "length of stay." Klarman 
also spoke directly to the issue of sul::>stitutability: 
Whenever an insured service (say inpatient care) 
and an uninsured service (say ambulatory care) 
compete as potential substitutes for one another, 
the insured service is likely to be preferred by 
the patient and condoned by the physiciano42 
One of the conclusions that flows frem these findings 
is·that the pursuit of risk aversion affects the structure 
ef health care insurance in that hospitalization insurance 
will be preferred by risk averting consumers. This will 
have an impact in the form of an increased demand for hos-
pital services given the distribution of·health care insur-
ance and the institutions and traditions of the medical care 
industry itself. Even within a more realistic set of 
assumptie:ms, the conclusiens derived from the abeve analysis 
would still apply in some degree to the behavior of a con-
sumer possessing a hospitalization insurance policyo Such 
41Hyman Joseph, "Hospital Insurance and Mer al· Hazard," 
Journal ef Human Resources, VII (Spring, 1972), p. 1600 
42 Klarman, po 32. 
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rational behavior on the part ef consumers, most ef whem ewn 
hespitalization insurance, is a basic behavieral assumptien 
for the purposes of this study. 
Profit and Property Right Incentives 
The presence or absence ef the 11 pr0fit metive'' <l>r of 
"preperty rights" in the hespital industry is presently an 
area ef intense research interest in the ecenemics prefes-
sien. Many writers have cencluded that the predeminantly 
nonprofit organization of the industry has significantly 
centributed te cost increaseso "It is believed that hespi-
tals are nG>t effectively restrained by market ferces because 
f th b f th f O t t O d t O t O II 4 3 o ea sence o e pro 1 me ive an compe 1 iono 
C. Wo Baird held that profit incentives should be directly 
teward physicians beca.use 
••• the physician is net directly affected when 
his misuse of hospital facilities causes financial 
treuble for the institution, hence he has ne incen-· 
tive to minimize the cest ef serving his patientso 
Physicians, of necessity, are the chief determiners 
of the uses ef the hespital. They are the directors 
of the preduction of health.44 
Baird also held that hespital efficiency weuld be better 
served if hospitals were awned, eutright by profit-maximizing 
physicians who might then benefit frem innovatiens arising 
43Taylor, Po 46. The market performance ef hospitals 
under varying degrees of competitien is the subject ef the 
hypothesis te be tested in this studyo That hypothesis is 
in cenflict with the effects ef cempetition implied by Taylero 
44charles w. Baird, "On Profits and H0spitals, 11 Jeurnal 
of Economic Issues, ·V (March, 1971), po 58~ 
frem the resulting competition ame:mg such profit-seeking 
organizations as would consumers of hospital care. 45 
M. Pauly and Mo Redisch have analyzed the nonprofit, 
hospital as a "physicians' c0operativeo 1146 They. relied en 
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both empirical evidence and the institutions surrounding the· 
medical care and hospital industries to f<:>rm a basis for 
their theorizing. They concluded that the observed behavior 
ef nonprofit hospitals is most congruent with the objective 
functien ef "maximizing physicians' incomes. 1147 Hespitals 
furnish physicians those medical inputs that best complement 
physicians' ewn resourceso Pauly and Redisch recognized the 
demand-originating role of the physician in both for-profit 
and nenprefit hospitals but conclude that physicians are 
able to claim a larger share ef the "residual inceme" 
(profits) from the production of medical care if those who 
contrel the hospital inputs used in production do not·have 
any such claim on residual,income in their objective func-
tions.48 Te put it more simply, physiciansw incomes are 
higher if the hospitals in which they practice are nonprefit· 
erganizationso Even if physicians owned the hospitals in 
.which they practiced medicine, they might well earn·mere by 
45 b 0 d 59 I· i · • , Po • 
46Pauly and Redisch, "The Not For-Prefi t Hespi tal," 
pp. 87-99 0 
47Ibid. 6 p. 880 
48 . 7 Ibid., P? 9 • 
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practicing in truly nonprofit hospitals because of the risks 
associated with ownership. Pauly and Redisch suggest that 
this may explain the predominantly nonprofit development of 
49 the hospital industry in this country. 
Empirical investigations of the hospital industry are 
building a body of evidence that offers support to the theo-
retical conclusions regarding the beneficial effects of the 
presence of the profit incentive. In comparing production 
functions of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals, J. D. Ogur 
concluded that "the type of ownership has a significant 
effect on the level of quantity of output obtained from a 
given level of input use. 1150 Ogur further held that 
•.• if the for-profit ••• type of hospital 
ownership were substituted for the nonprofit 
type 8 the results could well be • • • a reduc-. 
tion in resources devoted to ••• the purchase 
of sophisticated, but little used equipment ••• 
an increase in overall efficiency in the industry 
••• and an increase in the total quantity of 
service provided.51 
The differences between these two kinds of hospital 
business organizations may be best exhibited by differences 
in services mix rather than by differences in efficiency. 
Cost differences may be partly the result of for-profit hos-
pitals' preferences for particular kinds of physicians and 
49 b'd 98 I l. ., p. • 
50Jonathan D. Ogur, "The Nonprofit Form: A Test of the 
Theory for the Hospital Industry" (paper presented at the 
42nd meeting of the Southern Economic Association 6 Washing-
ton, D. c., November 10, 1972) ! p. 9. 
Slibid., pp. 9-10. 
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the kinds of patients that those physicians serve rather 
than just a basic .difference in efficiency. The behavior of 
for-profit hospitals to cater to particular kinds of physi-
cians and patients while excluding others has been described 
as "cream skimming." 
Basically 0 there are two types of cream skimming. 
First, is the practice of excluding patients 
(1) with long-term or complex illnesses that 
may have low utilization of profitable testing 
services or require extensive facilities for 
treatment; or (2) who do not pay full charges, 
such as welfare, Medicaid, and Medicare patients. 
This can be accomplished by locating the hospital 
in a wealthy neighborhood 0 selecting for staff 
appointments only doctors with appropriate clien-
tele, installing sophisticated emergency depart-
ments to. attract cases which require high utiliza-
tion of numerous facilities and other methods • 
• • • The second type of cream skimming is the 
offering of "profitable" services while not offer-
ing services which entail high investment and unit 
cost but are utilized at a low level •••• The 
central question is whether or not a community 
needs the facilities. If they do and nonprofit 
hospitals are providing them while proprietary 
hospitals are not, proprietary hospitals are not 
meeting social obligations" However, if there is 
no real need for addition~l facilities, proprietary 
hospitals can be credited for realizing that fur-
ther duplication leads to lower utilization and 
would only add additional unwarranted costs to the 
community's health care system. Until community 
need for particular facilities can be cencretely 
documented, this issue will remain mooto52 
Evidence cited at times to support the hypothesis that 
for-profit hospitals are cream skimmers relates to reports 
52oavid A. Stewart, "The Histery and Status of 
Proprietary Hospitals," Blue Cress Reports, Research Series 9 
(March, 1973), pp. 6-7. It is unclear what is meant when 
Stewart refers to the "social obligations" of proprietary 
hespitals and "community need" for facilities. The fulfill-
ment of social obligations and the satisfaction of community 
need would appear to be market processes. It is apparent 
that Stewart is viewing them in some other sense. 
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that patients do not stay as l0ng in for-profit as they do 
in nonprofit hospitals. 53 It is said this indicates a more 
profitable patient population in that more profitable 
ancillary services are used more intensely during the first 
few days of a hospital stay. Also cited are the less exten-
sive services available in for-profit hospitals. This 
restriction of services is said to "select" patients with 
the kinds of "profitable" ailments that the for-profit hos- 1 
pitals desire. 54 And an alternative hypothesis says that 
cost differences represent quality differences because for-
profit hospitals produce "cheaper" (substandard) medical 
products. But it should be noted that quality differences 
between hospitals might well reflect the response, to con-
sumer (physician) preferences for different products rather 
than any effort to lower costs (increase profits) by produc-
ing substandard products. 
Much evidence, however, indicates that the attachment 
of property rights to decision-making outcomes or the pres-
ence of the profit incentive results in more efficient, 
lower-cost production. 55 But only a proportion of the 
observed cost differentials between for-profit and nonprofit 
53Klarman, p. 110. Length-of-stay behavior contrary to 
that mentioned by Klarman was reported by D. B. Hill and 
D. A. Stewart in their "Proprietary Hospitals Versus Nonprofit· 
Hospitals: A Matched Sample Analysis in California," Blue 
Cross Reports 6 Research Series 9 (March, 1973), pp. 11-120 
54Karen Davis, "Economic Theories of Behavior in 
Nonprofit Hospitals," Economic and Business Bulletin, XXIV 
(Winter, 1972) 6 pp. 10-12. 
55B , d 59 60 air, pp. - o 
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hospitals should be ascribed to just profit motivated 
efficiency. 
Differential Behavior 0f For-Profit 
Versus Nonprofit H0spitals 
The focus of this study is not on the relative 
efficiencies of these two kinds of hospital business 
organizations; rather the focus is on the market performance 
of all hospitals regardless of their particular profit-
nonprofit·organization. The question that must be raised 
for the purposes of this study is~ Will for-profit hospitals 
respond to the wants of physicians in a manner similar to the 
response of nonprofit hospitals? The conclusion that might 
be derived from the discussion above indicates a cautious 
affirmative answer to this question. There exist no direct 
tests of this conclusion. However, K. W. Clarkson, in his 
investigation of property rights incentives on managerial 
efficiency, produced some data that lend tentative support 
to this conclusion a 56 He reported that 11:(,mprofit hospitals 
had a more formal and a more elaborate system of mana<3"ement 
and organizational structures than did for-profit hospitals. 
This required more time and effort (cost} on the part of 
private practice staff physicianso 57 Nonprofit hospitals 
56Kenneth W0 Clarkson; "Some Implications of Property 
Rights in Hospital Management," Journal of Law and Economicsf 
XV (Oct0ber, 1972) 5 pp. 363-84. 
57rbid., PPo 370-74. 
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were less interested in the opinions of staff physicians 
(their customers) and placed more restrictions on staff phy-
sicians for surgery privileges (earning power of a surgeon) 
than did for-profit hospitals. 58 And the nonprofit hospitals 
devoted less managerial effort to the supervision of patient 
care (the source of physicians' income) than did for-profit 
hospitals. 59 Clarkson's findings suggest that for-profit 
hospitals respond to 0r cater to the wants and interest ef 
their physician-customers mere intensely than de n0npr0fit, 
institutions in at least some areas of their activities. 
For the purposes of this study, similar response 
behavi0r between these two kinds of institutions is assumedo 
The empirical portion of this study includes a 11 Pr0fitMotive 11 
variable in the cost prediction equations. This serves as a 
test of this assumption. Unfortunately, there are only 
eight for-profit hospitals that report enough information to 
be included in the 107 Oklahoma hospitals in the set of 
observations for the empirical section of this study. 60 Any 
conclusions that might be forthcoming are thus rendered 
tentative, at besto 
SBibido 9 pp. 374-760 
59 rbid., pp. 372-74. 
60The American Hospital Association 1972 Guide to the 
Health Care Field (Chicago, 1972), pp. 176-81. Hereaft~ 
cited asAHA Guide o 
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Summary 
This chapter has reviewed those writings that directly 
pertain to the hypothesis of this studyo Additionally, this 
chapter has developed and presented the theoretical founda-
tions and the basic set of assumptions that are vital for a 
meaningful test of the central hypothesis of the studyo 
There are included reviews ef materials and the development 
of the theory regarding the production of medical care ancii 
its components~ the measurement and causes of hospital cost 
increases with particular attention paid to the effect that 
the structure of markets might have on hospital costs, the 
effect of health care insurance on the demand for hospital 
care, and the effect of the profit incentive on the effi-
ciency of hospital care productiono 
CHAPTER III 
THE ANALYTICAL MODEL: DATA, 
THEORY, AND SYNTHESIS 
Introduction 
• 
This chapter examines the sources of the data, 
formulates the model for the analysis of the data and 
testing of the hypothesis, and derives variables from the 
data for inclusion in the model. There is a brief discus-
sion of hospitals included in the set of observations. 
Appropriate economic and statistical theories are brought 
to bear regarding the formulation of the analytical model 
and the inclusion or exclusion ef particular measures and 
variables from the model. 
Sources of the Data 
Most of the data which are employed in the study are 
from the "Listing of Hospitals: Oklahoma" section of the 
AHA Guide. 1 In addition to providing data relating to many 
areas of the health care field, the AHA Guide lists con-
siderable information on a hospital-by-hospital basis. 
1 Data for Oklahoma hospitals are found on pages 176-81. 
An explanation of those data is given ibid., pp. 8-10. 
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Th0se data listed in the AHA Guide that are of particular 
interest for the purpeses of this study include the fellow-
ing fer each hespital in Oklahoma~ 
1. lecation by county and city or tewn, 
2. capacity (number of adult and pediatric beds 
and the number 0f·newb0rn bassinets), 
3. type of service (short term, l0ng term, 
special, etc.), 
4. centrol (local, state, federal, or private; 
nenprofit·or for-profit, etc.), 
5. average patient pepulatien, 
6. annual admissions and births, 
7. eccupancy rate, 
8. annual expenditur~s (total and fer personnel), 
9o average full-time equivalent empleyees, 
10. educational and teaching activities, 
11. accreditatiens and other approvals, and 
12. facilities and services available. 
Mest of the abeve data are available fer each hospital in 
the state ef Oklahoma. Only a few hospitals in the state do 
net report such inf0rmatien fer inclusion in the~ Guide; 
even these are listed by l0cati0n, capacity, and c0ntr0l. 
Only 0ne set 0f data necessary for testing the hyp0thesis ef 
this study is not possible t0 derive directly frem the AHA 
Guide; there is no way to determine if a particular hospital 
preduces in a mon0poly or in a more competitive market 
structure. 
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The determination of the relevant market in the h0spital 
industry is m0st commonly made with reference to the patient 
population. However, given that physicians are customers of 
hospitals, the determination is more pr0perly made with ref-
erence to the physician populatien. For the purposes of this 
study, the relevant market f0r a hospital is that area that 
included those physicians who were within "reasonable" corn-
muting distance of the hospitalo R. E. Berry likened mar-
kets fer hospital services t0 markets for service stations, 
i.e., they are defined by reasonable commuting distances. 2 
Such a delimitation of hospital markets is far fr0rn 
ideal in that the term "reasonable" is, and will remain, a 
bit ambiguous. "Reasonable" c0mmuting distances are, in 
fact, quite important considerations in the delimitation of 
hospital markets given that physicians are h0spitals 1 cus-
torners. Physicians must confine the market area from which 
they acquire hospital services to a rather compact geographic 
regien that allews short commuting times. Otherwise, much 
pr0ductive income-producing time w0uld be wasted commuting 
te and from distant hospitals. Such a c0nstraint would n0t 
apply in so telling a fashion if patients were viewed as 
hospitals' customers because of patients' relatively infre-
quent medical episodes that would require hospitalization. 
2Ralph E. Berry, Jro, "Competition and Efficiency in 
the Hospital Industry: The Structure of the American Hespi-
tal Industry" (unpublished PhoD. dissertation, Harvard 
Upiversity, 1965) ~ p. 23. 
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A rather simple pr0cedure was followed in this study to 
determine if a particular hospital was a monopolist or pro-
duced in a more competitive environment. If there existed a 
single h0spital in an isolated town 0r city, it was assumed 
that the hospital was a monopolist. And if there were two 
or more hospitals in a town or city, it was assumed that the 
hospitals were competitors. A more subjective approach was 
necessary to evaluate larger metropolitan areas. All hospi-
tals within such an area were assumed to be in a competitive 
environment. However, a hospital in, say, the northern area 
of a large city would not be a competitor of a hospital in, 
say~ the southern fringes of that city. Similar considera-
tions were applied to those hospitals located in independent 
towns and cities contiguous to large metropolitan areas. 
Additionally, there exist eight osteopathic hospitals 
in the state of Oklahoma, three of which report sufficient 
data to be included in the analysis. The institutions of 
the medical care industry are such that only those physicians 
that hold the Doctor of Osteopathic Medicine degree (D.O.) 
can practice in these hospitals. And holders of the D.O. 
degree do not customarily practice in other hospitals. Such 
constraints are beginning to be relaxed in many areas of the 
country but are still apparent in Oklahoma. Therefore, no 
osteopathic hospital, regardless of its location, was found 
to be in a competitive environment; there were no two osteo-
pathic hespitals in the same community or within "reasonable" 
commuting distances. 
Formulation of the Analytical Model 
The hypothesis to be tested is: "More intense 
competition in the hospital industry results in higher 
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rather than lower average costs o." A first task in under-
taking such a test is to formulate and derive a cost function 
for hospitals. Data from different h0spitals are then 
analyzed in such a relationship to evaluate the importance 
of differences in outputs in "explaining" variations in 
average costs among hospitals5 Recognizing- that the "eutput" 
of hospitals is in no sense a homogeneous good or service, 
it will be necessary to adjust for the nonhomogeneous or 
multiproduct nature of hospital output. Not only do hospi-
tals produce multiple medical products, some also produce 
education for student physicians, nurses, and technicians. 
Since empirical data are not subject to ceteris paribus 
constraints, it is necessary to consider differences among 
hospitals in (1) the efficiency of production, (2) quality 
of output, (3) scales of plant, (4) factors of production, 
(5) factor prices, and (6) the subject this study's hypothe-
sis, the degree or intensity of competitiono 
Such a cost relationship for a particular hospital can 
be stated as follows: 
C/Q = f (Q, M~ E, DI s I KI L, p, X) ( 1) 
where 
c = total cost of production 
Q = a measure of hospital output 
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M = measures ef the multipreduct 
nature ef hospital output 
E = measures of the efficiency 
of hospital production 
D = measures of differences in 
the quality ef output 
s = a measure of the scale of 
plant or the capacity of 
a hospital 
K = capital - a prexy fer fixed 
factors of preducti(:m 
L = labor - a proxy for variable 
factors of production 
p = prices of the factors of 
production 
X = the degree or intensity of 
cempetitiGno 
It will be useful to review each of the components of this 
relatienship and determine how and if each are derived frem 
the available data. 3 
The~ Guide reperts annual total expenditures for 
each-hospital. This is a rather ideal measure of the tetal 
cost 0f preduction (C) for each hospital. There are three 
measures of hospital output (Q) reported in the~ Guide: 
3A complete list and identification of the above 
determinants of average cost, the data and variables that 
represent them, and the abbreviations that are used in the 
study are furnished in the Appendix te this study. 
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(1) annual admissions, (2) average patient population, and 
(3) annual births. Births really represent the output ef a 
particular facility rather than total hospital output. The 
other two measures allow alternative formulations of the 
dependent variable in Equation (1), Average cost (C/0) is 
formulated as "cest per admissien" and as "cost per day 0f 
patient care'' by converting "average patient pepulaticm" 
int0 "annual patient days." These are different measures 
ef average cest in that cest per admissi0n depends on the 
number ef patient days of hospital care. This could vary 
among hespitals depending· 0h the ailments ef the patients 
physicians admitted to hospitals and en the desires of both 
patients and physicians fer long er short stays in a hospi-
tal. Beth measures ef average cost are subjected to sepa-
rate analyses. "Cest per admissi0n 11 is f0rmulated from the· 
data as: 
(C/0) 1 = CPAD = (Annual total expenditures) . 
(Annual admissions) = 
(TCOST) . (ADM) 
and 11 c0st per day ef-patient care" is: 
(C/0) 2 = CPPD = (Annual tetal.expenditures) . 
(Average patient population x 
(365) = (TCOST) ~ (CENSUS) x 
( 365) , 
the denominator of (C/0) 2 being "annual patient days." The 
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measure of output used with "c0st per admissicm" (CPAD) is 
"annual admissions." In the analytical model, this is 
restated as "admissions per day" (ADMD) to avoid large 
cumbersome numbers present in the original data. The output 
measure used with "cost per day of patient care" (CPPD) is 
"average patient population" (CENSUS) taken directly frGm 
the AHA Guide. Each of these measures is entered in the 
respective cost functions in both linear and quadratic forms, 
in order to test the assumption of the "U" shapedness 0f the 
average c0st curves. 
The derivation of a measure of the "multiproduct nature 
of hospital output" (M) presents some theoretical problems. 
The AHA Guide reports whether or net each hospital has par-
ticular facilities or effers particular services and whether 
or not there exist particular educational programs in hospi-
tals. These data are explicit indications of the multi-
product nature of hespital output. However, redundancy of 
facilities and services among hospitals is implicitly 
hypothesized in this study as being the result ef competi-
tion among hespitals for physicians. Each facility or ser-
vice can be adjusted for such a dependency 0n cempetitien by 
adding "interaction" variables in the form of "degree of 
c0mpetition" times each facility or service. Such a statis-
tical process would be very "expensive" in terms of degrees 
0f freedem. Given the relatively small number of h0spitals 
(observations) in the state ef Oklahoma, such an adjustment 
is not attempted in the analysis. It is not known what 
impact the absence·of this adjustment might have on the 
analytical results. 
Other investigators have attempted to adjust for the 
multiproduct nature of hospital output in less subtle 
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fashions. W. J. Carr and P. J. Feldstein adjusted hospital 
output for this multiproduct characteristic by including the 
number of such facilities and services in each hospital as a 
separate independent variable in their cost equations. 4 The 
problem with such an approach is that there is an implicit 
assumption that the strength and direction of the impact on 
cost of each facility or service-is identical. 5 Neverthe-
less, this adjustment proved valuable in Carr and Feldstein's 
analysis of hospital costs. R. E. Berry, in approaching a 
similar adjustment problem, included each service and facil-
ity as a separate independent variable in his regression 
equations. 6 This technique overcame the weakness of Carr 
and Feldstein's approach regarding the strength and direction 
of·the effect on cost of particular facilities and services. 
Therefore, in this study, Berry's method is approximated and· 
each facility, service; or educational program that exists 
in three or more hospi,tals appears as a separate independent 
variable in the model. The restriction on "three or more'' 
4w. John Carr and Patil. J. ,Feldstein, "The Relationship 
of Cest to Hespital Size,".· I1;1quiry, IV (June, 1967), pp. 54-
57. 
'Iii 1, 
5Ralph E. Berry, Jre,' "Prod~ct aeter0geneity and 
Hospital C0st Analysis," InquiE.Y,, VII (March, 1970), p. 70. 
6Ibid., pp. 71-73. 
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occurrences is an attempt to avoid the problem of 
tautological results arising from statistical procedures. 
Measurement of the efficiency of hospital production is 
conceptually difficult given the multiproduct characteristic 
of this industry. Berry held that there were no data from 
which a measure of efficiency could be derived, 7 However, 
the AHA Guide contains data that are somewhat suggestive of 
efficiency measures. "Occupancy .rate" 'ORATE}, the ratio of 
"average patient population" (CENSUS) to the "number of 
adult and pediatric beds" (BEDS) is· a measure of output to 
capital as is "admissions per bed" (ADBED), the ratio of 
"annual admissions" (ADM) to the "number of adult and pedi-
atric beds" (BEDS). A more subtle measure of the "efficiency 
of hospital production" might be lllength of stay" (LSTAY), 
the ratio of "annual patient days of care" to "annual admis-
sions" (ADM), And the number of births per newborn bassinet 
(BBASS) is a measure of output to capital in a particular 
hospital department. While no one (or even all) of these 
ratios is entirely adequate, each is suggestive of a measure 
of a particular kind of efficiency. Therefore, these ratios 
are included as separate independent, variables in the ana-
1yti cal model • 
The "measure of the qual1. ty of hospital output" [ "D" in 
Equation Cl) J encounters conceptual and data problems sim1-
lar to those encountered in the case of efficiency. Berry 
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again held that data regarding the quality of hospital output 
d . 8 o not,exist. But, again, some data reported in the~ 
Guide, as in the case of efficiency, are suggestive of 
"quality." Accreditatien by either the American H0spital 
Asseciation or by the American Osteopathic Hospital Associ-
atien {ACCR) indicates that such hospitals have met standards 
that likely enhance the quality of their outputs. And 
affiliation of. a hospital with a medical school (MEDSCH) 
says much the same regarding standards and quality of output. 
Similarly, approval·of a hospital for reimbursement by Blue 
Cross plans (BCROSS) or by ~edicare (MEDCRE} alsG> indicates 
that particular standards have been met. However, meeting 
particular standards speaks only to the potential f0r 
enhanced output quality, not te its certainty. Even con-
sidering the· conceptual weakness of these measures, ACCR, 
MEDSCH, BCROSS, and MEDCRE are included separately in the 
model as measures of the quality of hospital output. 
It was suspected early in this study that there would 
exist a high degree·of collinearity between particular data. 
For instance, it was logical to assume that measures such as 
"t0tal expenditures" and "capacity" would be highly corre-
lated. Additionally, it was suspected that measures such as 
"full-time equivalent personnel," "annual personnel expendi-
tures," "annual admissions," "average patient population," 
and ethers w0uld be highly correlated, not only with "tetal 
48 
expenditures," but with "capacity" and each of the other 
measures mentioned. Such suspicions, if confirmed, would 
cause serious multicollinearity if more than one of these 
measures are used as independent variables in a multiple 
regression statistical model. First order correlation 
coefficients were calculated for each pair of data from the 
AHA Guide and many of the ratios of data and variables con-
sidered for inclusion in the analytical model. An abbrevi-
ated summarization of those results as they apply to this 
discussion is presented in Table I. It is shown that there 
exist very large correlations between each of the measures 
of output and any of the measures that might be used to rep-
resent "capacity," 11 capital, 11 or "labor. 11 Measures of out-
put are deemed theoretically crucial to the cost relationship; 
and since the addition of any measures of II capacity," 
"capital," or "labor" to the analytical model introduces 
serious multicollinearity with already-included output 
measures, direct measures of capacity, capital, and labor 
are excluded from the mode.1. This particular solution to 
the multicollinearity problem biases the statistical esti-
mate of the effect of output on average cost. In this par-
ticular case, the effect of output on average cost is biased 
upward. 9 In a sense, "output" is serving as a substitute or 
proxy for the independent variables: output, capacity, 
9oavid s. Huang, Regression and Econometric Methods 
(New York, 1970), pp. 149-58. 
TABLE I 
MATRIX OF CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: TEST FOR COLLINEAR DATA* 
ADM 
CENSUS 
BIRTHS 
BEDS 
BASS 
PERNL 
PCOST 
TCOST 
ADM 
LOOOO 
CENSUS BIRTHS 
C• 9886 .9262 
loOOOO c9069 
1.0000 
ADM: Annual admissions 
CENSUS: Average patient days of care 
BIRI'HS ~ Annual number of births 
Number of adult and pediatric beds 
Number of newborn bassinets 
BEDS 
09743 
c9895 
.8900 
1.0000 
. BEDS r 
BASS~ 
PERNL: 
PCOST: 
Number of full-time equivalent employees 
Annual personnel expenditures 
TCOST: Annual total expenditures 
BASS PERNL 
.9046 c9722 
.8907 .9865 
.9142 .9185 
.8833 09827 
1.0000 08733 
lcOOOO 
PCOST TCOST 
09697 . 9741 
.9821 .9868 
c9l82 .9140 
09826 .9855 
.8800 .8921 
.9927 .9902 
LOOOO .9970 
1.0000 
*All tests of the hypothesis that rho "" 0, the probability that the absolute value of rho > I rl, 
were equal to or smaller than .0001 for each cell in the matrix. 
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capital, and labor. However, no conclusions can be made 
.regarding the magnitude of the bias and the magnitude of the 
effects of the excluded variables. 
While the model includes·no measures of the "scale of 
plant or capacity" (S) or no measures of "capital or fixed 
factors of production" (K) or "labor or variable factors of 
production" (L), it is possible to include the ratio of labor 
to capital (L/K) without encountering multicollinearity 
problems. "Full-time equivalent employees" (PEffi!JL) is used 
as the numerator, and the sum of "number of beds" (BEDS) and 
"number of newborn bassinets" (BASS) as the denominator of 
this ratio of L to K. This is more accurately the ratio of 
labor to "size".where size (BEDS plus BASS) serves as a sub-
stitute for a measure of the quantity of capital. In the 
analytical model this ratio is named 11 PNLSIZ." This is not 
an adequate substitute for measures of either labor or capi-
tal but it does provide a gross indication of factor propor-
tions. 
The data are not sufficient to provide prices of the 
factors of production (P) called for in Equation (1). The 
AHA Guide separates only that proportion of total expendi-
tures allocated for labor. Allocations of cost for capital 
and all other inputs to the hospital care production process 
are not collected or reported separately. Therefore, the 
only measure of the pric.es of factors that can be abstracted 
from the data is the wage rate. This is derived from the 
AHA Guide by dividing PCOST by PERNL, giving "average annual 
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wage." This is a rather cumbersome number and was converted 
into "average daily wage" (DWAGE) for analytical use. 
There was considerable discussion above regarding the 
potential effects of the presence or absence of the "profit 
incentive" on hospital costs. The AHA Guide indicates 
whether or not each individual hospital is organized as a 
profit-making institution. This indication appears in the 
model as an independent variable named "PM." It might be 
best classified as one of the measures of "effic~ency." 
However, special interest in the effects of the "profit 
incentive" justifies this distinct category not indicated in 
Equation (1). 
The derivation of the measure of the "degree or 
intensity of competition" was discussed above in some 
detail. This measure appears as a separate independent 
variable in the model as the number of other hospitals that 
are competing with the hospital in question. Its value is 
zero if the hospital is a monopolist, one if there are two 
hospitals in a market area; two if there are three hospi-
tals, etc. This measure, indicated as "X" in Equation (1), 
is named "COMPT" in the empirical analysis. And as in the 
case of "PM," this measure might also best be categorized as 
one of the measures of "efficiency." 
Hospitals Included in the Set 
of Observations 
Before specifying the analytical model, it is well to 
discuss the Oklahoma hospitals that make up the "set of 
observations" for this study. In order to impose as many 
ceteris paribus restrictions as possible for the analysis, 
particular hospitals are excluded from the set of observa-
tions. Those hospitals owned and operated by agencies of 
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the federal government were excluded. They typically hire 
full-time staff physicians; their costs, therefore, are not 
comparable with those of similar hospitals that do not hire 
medical staff. Those hospitals that produce nontypical 
products were excluded. Examples are psychiatric, tubercu-
losis, and other specialized hospitals. Again, cost per 
unit of output was not comparable with cost in more usual 
general hospitals. And those hospitals that did not report 
sufficient data were excluded. Of the 155 Oklahoma hospitals 
listed in the AHA Guide, 107 met sufficient criteria to be 
included in the "set of observations." Those included are 
all "general medical and surgical" hospitals. Some are non-
profit institutions owned and operated by local governmental 
units and others are profit-making institutions owned and 
operated by individuals or corporations. The majority are 
nonprofit institutions owned and operated by private benevo-
lent organizations such as churches and other religious 
groups. 
Specification of the Analytical Model 
Equation (1) expresses a functional relationship 
between average cost of production in hospitals and those 
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characteristics of hospitals and data from hospital care 
production that, according to economic theory, determine 
average cost. Particular measures of some of these charac-
teristics and some "second best" substitutes for unavailable 
data have been discussed above in some detail. These were 
formulated into variables for inclusion in the analytical 
model. The model is specified in the form of a set of 
multiple linear regression equations. An equation for one 
particular hospital is: 
where the b. 's are the parameters of the model to be 
1 
estimated and c, Q, M, etc., have been identified above. 10 
It must be noted that there will be two distinct models in 
that alternative measures of output (Q) and average cost 
(C/Q) are employed in separate estimating equations as dis-
cussed above. These two models [Equation (2)] are subjected 
to the analytical methodologies which are discussed in the 
next chapter. A discussion of the expected algebraic signs 
lORefer to the Appendix for complete identification of 
the components of Equation (2). 
54 
of the coefficients of each of the variables in Equation (2) 
is relegated to Chapter V so as to precede the discussion of 
the analytical results. 
Summary 
This chapter has discussed the sources of data, the 
particular areas of economic theory and empirical investi-
gation that concern the problems faced in this part of the 
study, and synthesized data and theory into an analytical 
model. The result is similar in form and specification to 
models utilized by other researchers to investigate vari-
ations in average cost among hospitals. Therefore, it is 
a useful starting point to evaluate the effect that the 
"degree or intensity of competition" has on average cost. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE METHODOLOGIES OF ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
This c~apter introduces and discusses the statistical 
tools and other analytical devices that are used to test the 
hypothesis and to interpret the results of that test. The 
major statistical and analytical technique used in this study 
is "multiple linear regression" as indicated by the specifi-
cation of Equation (2). Variants of this technique such as 
"stepwise" regression and other "sequential model construc-
tion" methods are employed to develop the argument in support 
of the hypothesis. Modern computer programs are analytical 
methodologies in their own rights and those that are used in 
this study are discussed concurrently with the associated 
statistical techniques. Only a few particular tests of sta-
tistical significance are discussed in any detail as most are 
integral parts of the statistical and computer methods 
employed in the study. In addition to multiple regression 
techniques, the independent variables in Equation (2) are 
subjected to "factor analysis" to analyze the theoretical 
soundness of the grouping of variables to represent the 
"multiproduct nature," "efficiency," and "quality" of 
hospital output. 
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Regression Analysis and Computer Methods 
A collection of computer programs that is available for 
use through the Oklahoma State University Computer Center 
contains sufficient statistical tools and options to perform 
the bulk of the analytical processes in this study. This 
collection is the "Statistical Analysis System" (S. A. S.) 
developed by A. J. Barr and J. H. Goodnight. 1 
Both alternative forms of Equation (2) are fitted to 
the data using the s. A. s. multiple regression procedure. 
This procedure allows for an inspection of the multiple 
regression coefficients and their algebraic signs. Addi-
tionally, these results establish the proportion of the 
variation in average cost that can be explained by the model, 
i.e., the R2 statistics for both forms of Equation (2). 
However, given the large number of independent variables 
(regressors) and the relatively small number of observa-
tions, meaningful interpretation of the results are tenta-
tive, at best. Aside from the "degress of freedom" problems, 
the number of regressors in the model presents a serious 
interpretation problem. 
Generally, when the number of independent variables 
becomes large, say, greater than 7, the interpre-
tation of the regression equation becomes difficult. 
That is, we cannot pinpoint what is the cause of 
the •.. [variation in the dependent variable]. 2 
1Jolayne Service, A User's Guide to the Statistical 
Analysis System (Raleigh, N. c., 1972)-:-- ~-
2Taro Yamane, Statistics: An Introductory Analysis, 
3rd ed. (New York, 1973), p. 994-.-
While specifying a particular maximum number of regressors 
may be a bit arbitrary, there is no doubt that interpreta-
tion becomes clearer if the regression equation is con-
strained to some "reasonable" number of regressors. 
It is assumed that of the 48 regressors in the model, 
some are not too "important" in explaining the behavior of 
average cost. Including those irrelevant regressors in a 
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multiple regression model.such as Equation (2) will 
"increase the variance of all the least squares estimates. 113 
Eliminating them biases the least squares estimates unless 
the "true" values of their coefficients are zero. 4 In this 
study, the advantages that accrue by eliminating irrelevant 
regressors outweigh the problems introduced by such a pro-
cess. 
A popular technique to eliminate irrelevant regressors 
from a multiple regression model entails first regressing 
all independent variables and then inspecting the test sta-
tistics associated with each variable's coefficient and 
eliminating those whose test statistics are not sufficiently 
significant by some predetermined criterion. This belongs 
to that set of techniques known as "sequential model con-
struction." A common danger associated with all such 
sequential methods is the tendency to allow them to replace 
3Potluri Rao, "Some Notes on Misspecification in 
Multiple Regressions," The American Statistician, XXV 
(December, 1971), p. 39. 
4Ibid. 
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or to grossly intrude upon theorizing. 5 Such might be the 
danger in this study if the object of the analysis had been 
only to construct a "compact" cost-prediction equation. 
However, the object of the analysis is to assess the inde-
pendent effects of the "degree of competition" on average 
cost by adjusting for other theoretically sound determinants 
of average cost. Therefore, techniques that select "imper-
tant" regressors from a set already preselected on the basis 
of sound theorizing aids in achieving this object. 
Programs in the s. A. s. collection contain several 
variations of "stepwise regression" that perform this selec-
tion process. There are options available in these programs 
that allow the investigator to specify various criteria for 
dropping, adding, or replacing regressors in the model. 
The "Forward Selection" stepwise regression routine from the 
s. A. S. collection first selects that regressor that pro-
duces the largest R2 statistic from all regressors contained 
in the original model [Equation (2) in this case]. Then a 
second regressor is added, the criterion for its inclusion 
being that no other regressor would produce as large an "F" 
statistic had it been included instead. The routine keeps 
adding regressors until none can be found that produce an 
"F" statistic that is significant at some predetermined 
level. 6 The 50 percent (.50) level of significance is 
5T. D. Wallace and v. G. Ashar, "Sequential Methods in 
Model Construction," Review of Economics and Statistics, 
LIV (May, 1972), pp. 172-78.~ 
6service, "A User's Guide to the SAS," p. 127. 
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chosen for the purposes of this study. The stepwise 
regression routine that is named "Stepwise" in the s. A. s. 
collection performs the same selection functions as does the 
Forward Selection procedure. And as in Forward Selection, 
Stepwise stops adding regressors when no other regressor can 
be found that produces an "F" statistic that is significant 
at some predetermined level. But Stepwise then additionally 
checks to insure that all already-included regressors remain 
significant at some other predetermined level or be deleted 
from the model. 7 The level of significance chosen for 
"remaining in the model" is 10 percent (.10). The Stepwise 
procedure usually results in a model with fewer regressors 
than the Forward Selection procedure. 
The "Maximum R2 Improvement Technique" in the s. A. s. 
collection allows the investigator to choose a model that 
contains any number of regressors from one to as many as 
desired. The investigator has some assurance that whichever 
sized model is chosen, it will produce the largest R2 sta-
tistic of any other model with the same number of independent 
variables. The Maximum R2 procedure first selects the single 
regressor from those in the original equation that produces 
the largest R2 • Then a second regressor is selected that 
produces the largest gain in R2 o All excluded regressors 
are then compared with the first regressor to insure that no 
switch would produce a larger R2 • A third regressor is 
7Ibid., pp. 127-8. 
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selected and, again, all excluded regressors are compared 
but not with just the second but with all already-included 
independent variables. Any switches that would result in a 
' ' R2 d dh ' ' d gain in are ma e an ten comparisons are again ma e 
before another regressor is added to the model. The pro-
cedure can be started and stopped with the numbers of vari-
ables that the investigator views as appropriate. 8 
This section of the chapter has outlined the principal 
analytical method that is used to test the study's hypothe-
sis: multiple regression and some related sequential 
methods made possible by high-speed computers and appropri-
ate "software." In addition to regressing all 48 variables 
in Equation (2), the techniques, Forward Selection, Stepwise, 
and Maximum R2 Improvement, are employed to develop argument 
in support of the study's hypothesis. Particular results 
are discussed in detail but no model is selected as being 
the "best" single model. 
Test for Interaction 
Given that the hypothesis is supported, it might be 
said that the "degree or intensity of competition" does not 
measure the independent effects of competition but, instead, 
measures some combination, say, of competition, output, size, 
and efficiency. Therefore, in addition to the independent 
variables in Equation (2), interaction variables are 
8Ibid., p. 128. 
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included in the form of "degree of competition" (COMPT) 
multiplied by each of the measures of efficiency and by the 
measure of output. Additionally, there are interaction 
terms included in the form of COMPT times the "labor to 
capital ratio" (PNLSIZ) and the "wage rate" (DWAGE). COMPT 
itself is included in quadratic form in order to discuss the 
possibility of some "optimum" intensity of competition. The 
variables to be added are: 
(COMPT) x (COMPT) = COM 2 
(COMPT) x (CENSUS) = CM CS or 
(COMPT) x (ADMD) = CM AM 
(COMPT) x (ORATE) = CM OR 
(COMPT) x (LSTAY) = CM LS 
(COMPT) x (ADBED) = CM_AB 
(COMPT) x (BBASS) = CM BS 
(COMPT) x (PNLSIZ) = CM PZ 
(COMPT) x (DWAGE) = CM DW 
The addition of eight more variables to Equation (2) 
makes any attempt to interpret a regression including all 
variables almost hopeless. Therefore, only the stepwise 
regression procedures are employed to evaluate the extent of 
the interaction between COMPT and the other measures. 
It was mentioned above that it would be desirable to 
analyze interactions between the degree of competition and 
measures of the multiproduct nature of hospital output. 
This is not attempted because of the large number of such 
measures in Equation (2). And if a cost prediction equation 
was the primary object of the study, it would be desirable 
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to analyze interactions between all combinations of 
regressors. Given the particular object of this study, the 
analysis of interactions is restricted to the eight listed 
above in this section. 
Evaluation of Sequential Methods 
All of the stepwise regression procedures used in the 
study have a single purpose. They are used to eliminate 
those independent variables from Equation (2) and the added 
interaction variables that do little in explaining vari-
ations in average cost among hospitals. There is an implicit 
assumption that the multiple regression coefficients of the 
excluded regressors are equal to zero. A statistical test 
of this assumption is valuable in evaluating the sequential 
model construction methods that are used in the analysis. 
Huang discusses partial joint tests that use R2 statistics 
for tests of hypotheses regarding the nullness or "zero 
values" of the coefficients of regressors excluded from a 
model. 9 An appropriate te.st of the hypothesis that the 
coefficients of "m" additional regressors are not different 
from zero is: 
F = 2 ( 1-R ) I (n-k-1) 
where "F" is evaluated with "m" and "n-k-1" degrees of 
9Huang, pp. 99-103. 
freedom; tiR2 is the gain in R2 when the "m" variables are 
included in the model; "n" is the number of observations; 
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"k" is the total number of independent variables (m + x = k); 
and R2 results from regressing all "k" regressors. 10 Even 
the importance of a single regressor can be evaluated with 
this test. An extension of this test allows the investigator 
to test the hypothesis that all of the independent variables 
in any sized model do not contribute to the explanation of 
the variation in the dependent variable. 11 If the calculated 
value of "F" is found to be statistically significant in any 
of the above tests, the null hypothesis regarding the impor-
tance of the excluded regressors is rejected. Conversely, a 
nonsignificant value of ·"F" says that the hypothesis that 
the excluded regressors are not important cannot be rejected. 
These "partial joint tests" are employed in the analysis to 
evaluate some of the results of the various stepwise regres-
sion procedures. 
Factor Analysis and the Determinants 
of Average Cost 
The particular groupings of various data and measures 
to represent the determinants of average cost in Equation (1) 
are in agreement with economic theory. Empirical data, 
lOibid., pp. 101-2. 
11rbid., p. 103. 
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however, do not always conform to theory. The technique of 
factor analysis applied to the independent variables in 
Equation {2) will produce a set of orthogonal "factors" con-
sisting of correlations between each such factor and each 
independent variable. These correlations or factor loadings 
indicate the strength of the relationship between each inde-
pendent variable and particular factors. Variables can be 
relegated to particular factors using these factor loadings 
as criteria. Berry employed this technique to discern par-
ticular product mixes produced by hospitals. 12 He was able 
to identify meaningfully eight factors that represented dif-
ferent characteristics of the multiproduct nature of hospi-
tal output. 13 Berry was encouraged by those results in that 
meaningful identification of factors is not always possible. 
This technique (again, from the s. A. S. collection) is 
applied to the regressors in Equation (2). The resulting 
factors are tentatively identified in order to gain some 
insights regarding the theoretical soundness for the group-
ings of variables in Equation (2) to represent output and 
its multiproduct nature, efficiency, quality, etc., that are 
identified in Equation (1). 
12Berry, "Product Heterogeneity and Hospital Cost 
Analysis," pp. 73-5. 
13Ibid. 
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Summary 
This chapter has discussed the analytical methodologies 
that are employed in the test of the study's hypothesis and 
in other analytical processes. The statistical and computer 
methods that are employed in the analysis were discussed as 
were some particular tests to evaluate the results of those 
methods. A method to evaluate the particular formulation of 
the average cost relationship was also discussed. 
• 
CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses some a priori expectations and 
presents the results of the analysis of the model and the 
results of the testing of the study's central hypothesis. 
There is also a discussion of the results of a factor analy-
sis of the model's independent variables in order to furnish 
some justification for the groupings of variables to repre-
sent the determinants of average cost. 
The first section of the chapter discusses the a priori 
expectations of the algebraic signs of the multiple regres-
sion coefficients of the independent variables in Equation 
(2). The second section of the chapter presents the results 
of the regressions that include all of the independent vari-
ables in Equation (2). There is some emphasis in the dis-
cussion in this and other sections of the chapter on the 
second form of Equation (2) where the dependent variable is 
"cost per day of patient care" (CPPD). Such emphasis follows 
the lead of other investigators who have viewed the unit of 
hospital output as being a day of patient care more fre-
quently than as being an admission (or discharge). The 
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third section presents and discusses the results of the 
Forward Selection and Stepwise regression procedures. The 
implications of the results of "partial joint tests" regard-
ing the reduction in the number of regressors are explored. 
The fourth section of the chapter presents and discusses the 
results of the Maximum R2 Improvement Technique. As in the 
third section, the implications of tests are discussed. The 
fifth section of the chapter discusses the results of the 
tests for interactions between COMPT and other variables. 
The sixth section of the chapter presents the results of 
the factor analysis and discusses their implications regard-
ing the formulation of the model. 
Some Theoretical Expectations 
The direction and impact on· average cost of only some 
of the independent variables in the model can be determined 
on the basis of economic theory. Table II lists each inde-
pendent variable for both forms of Equation (2) and indicates 
for each the a priori expectation regarding the algebraic 
sign of its multiple regression coefficient. Where no deter-
mination can be made on the basis of theory or prior knowl-
edge, a question mark appears. For instance, in the cases 
of RESI, INTERN, and NURSE, it is not known if the cost of 
such educational programs has a greater positive effect on 
average cost or if the lower-priced or free labor of students 
has a greater negative effect. Certain facilities and ser-
vices are known to be quite expensive to acquire and operate. 
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TABLE II 
EXPECTED SIGNS OF REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS 
Expected sign of 
coefficient when 
dependent variable 
Variable from e~uals: 
Equation (2) Abbreviation CPAD CPPD 
Ql ADMD 
Q2 CENSUS 
(Q ,2 AMO 2 + 1 
(Q ) 2 CEN 2 + 2 
Ml CANCER ? ? 
M2 RES! ? ? 
M3 INTERN ? ? 
M4 NURSE ? ? 
MS RECOV ? ? 
M6 ICU + + 
M7 !CCU + + 
MB OHS + + 
Mg FTP ? ? 
MlO PTP ? ? 
Mll XRT + + 
Ml2 CBT + + 
Ml3 RDT + + 
Ml4 ORD + + 
MlS TRD + + 
Ml6 PATH ? ? 
Ml7 BLBK ? ? 
Ml8 ECEP ? ? 
Ml9 IHTH ? ? 
M20 PREM + + 
~l scu 
M22 EXCU + 
M23 REN! + + 
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TABLE II (.Continued) 
Expected sign of 
coefficient when 
dependent variable 
Variable frbm eguals: 
Equation (2) Abbreviation CPAD CPPD 
M24 RENO + + 
M25 PHTH + ? 
M26 OCTH + ? 
M27 REHO + + 
M28 PSYI + + 
M29 PSYE + + 
M30 OPD + + 
M31 EMR + + 
M32 SWD ? ? 
M33 HAX 
M34 VLS 
El ORATE 
E2 ADBED 
E3 BBASS 
E4 LSTAY + 
Dl ACCR + + 
02 MEDSCH + + 
D3 BCROSS + + 
D4 MEDCRE + + 
PM PM 
L/K PNLSIZ + + 
p DWAGE + + 
x COMPT + + 
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This knowledge alone, however, does not assure accurate 
prediction of the signs of multiple regression coefficients. 
Nevertheless, where there is even this degree of prior knowl-
edge, the expected signs of the coefficients are indicated. 
Examples are the positive sign for the coefficient of CBT 
(cobalt th~rapy facility} and the negative sign for VLS 
(volunteer services department}. Reference is made to this 
discussion and to Table II when the empirical results differ 
from these expectations. 
Multiple Regression Results: 
Forty-Eight Independent 
Variables 
Both forms of the model were fitted to the data. Those 
results are summarized in Table III. In both cases, substan-
tial proportions of the variation in average cost is 
explained by Equation (2). There are, however, some con-
flicts regarding the expected signs of the regression 
coefficients and the results of the regressions. In many 
instances, the test statistics are such that the importance 
of the conflicts can be discounted. In the cases of MEDSCH, 
BCROSS, MEDCRE, OHS, XRT, and EMR, the differences between 
expectations and results cannot be so easily discounted. 
While the test statistics for MEDSCH, BCROSS, and MEDCRE are 
not significant, the contrary signs and the magnitudes of 
the coefficients for three of the four measures of the qual-
ity of hospital output demand some comment. It may be that 
TABLE III 
REGRESSION RESULTS~ ALL FORTY-EIGHT INDEPENDENT VARIABLES* 
Dependent variable CPAD, R2~ c92466 Dependent variable CPPD, R2: c 89387 
Independent Coefficients t-Scores Prob. of a Coefficients t-Scores Prob. of a 
variables (b values) H : 
0 
b=O greater ltl (b values) H : b=O greater ltl 0 
Intercept 190.572 79.800 
Ql (ADMD) 2.554 -0.747 .536 
Q2 (CENSUS) - 0.039 -0.556 .587 
(Q ) 2 (AMD_2) 0.019 0.424 .677 
1 
(Q >2 (CEN_2) 0.000+ 0.430 .673 2 
Ml (CANCER) 43.217 0.526 .607 10.796 0.910 • 630 
M2 ( RESI) 92.479 o. 763 .545 8.958 0.517 .613 
M (INTERN) 
3 1. 513 Oc023 .978 - 0.782 -0.090 .926 
M4 (NURSE) 58.949 L163 • 248 2.918 0.406 .689 
MS (RECOV) - 15.325 -1.124 .265 - 2.418 -1.246 .216 
M6 (ICU) 15.405 0.968 .661 2.222 0.987 .671 
M7 (ICCU) [ +] - 11.356 -Oc889 .618 [ +] - L513 -0.824 .582 
MB (OHS) [+] - 39.361 -0.942 .648 [ +] - 7. 848 -1. 306 .194 
M9 (FTP) 0.211 -0. 012 .987 o. 371 0.149 c877 
MlO (PTP) 12.579 0.887 c618 1.404 0.689 .501 
Mll (XRT) [+] - 57.186 -2.220 .029 [+] - 9.861 -2.658 .010 
M (CBT) [ +] - 7.515 -0.120 c901 L463 0.161 .867 -..J 12 I-' 
TABLE III (Continued) 
Dependent variable CPAD, R2~ 092466 Dependent variable CPPD, R2: • 89387 
Independent Coefficients t-Scores Prob. of a Coefficients t-Scores Probo of a 
variables (b values) H 
' 
b""O greater ltl (b values) H : b=O greater ltl 0 0 
Ml3 (RDT) 14.841 0. 322 . 747 2.535 0.383 • 705 
Ml4 (DRD) 56.491 2.594 .012 7.623 2 .401 .019 
Ml5 (TRD) [+] -57.267 -L294 0198 [+] - 5.967 -0.942 .648 
Ml6 (PATH) 29.690 1.110 .271 4.206 1.092 • 279 
Ml7 (BLBK) -150769 -L279 .203 - 2.105 -1.184 .240 
Ml8 (ECEP) -11. 382 -0.317 .751 - 40121 -0.761 0544 
Ml9 (IHTH) 12.140 0.698 .505 2.072 0.837 .589 
M20 (PREM) [+] -170833 -0.984 .670 [+] - 2.401 -0.924 .638 
M21 (SCU) [-] 0.021 0.001 .999 - 2.541 -00574 .575 
M22 (EXCU) [ +] -12.528 -0.436 .668 - 0.504 -0.121 .900 
M23 (RENI) 15.613 0 .271 0 734 4.238 0.507 .620 
M24 (RENO) 23.023 0.365 0 717 [+] - 0.804 -0.087 .929 
M25 (PHTH) [+] - 1.481 -0.088 .928 - 0.280 -0.116 .904 
M26 (OCTH) 35.145 0.651 .525 4.668 0.606 .554 
M27 (REHO) [+] -21.625 -o. 355 0 725 [+] - 4 .679 -0.521 .611 
M28 (PSYI) 5.561 0.155 .872 0.879 0.171 • 859 
M29 (PSYE) 19. 326 0.505 .621 [+] - 0.061 -0.011 0988 
M30 (OPD) 430195 2.050 .042 50802 L909 .058 
-..J 
N 
TABLE III (Continued) 
Dependent variable CPAD, R2: .92466 DeEendent variable CPPD, R2: .89387 
Independent Coefficients t-Scores Prob. of a Coefficients t-Scores Prob. of a 
variables (b values) H : b=O greater !ti (b values) H : b=O greater !ti 0 0 
M31 (EMR) [+] - 34.185 -1.979 .049 [+] - 4.535 -1. 836 .068 
M32 (SWD) - 45.940 -1.242 .217 - 6. 585 -1. 263 .209 
M33 (HAX) [-] 12.521 0.920 • 363 [-] 1. 725 0.873 .610 
M34 (VLS) [-] 19.202 .950 .652 [-] 2.076 o. 726 .523 
El (ORATE) L878 -1. 371 .172 - 0.374 -1. 896 .060 
E (ADBED) 7.806 -3.027 .004 - 1.001 -2.755 .008 2 
E3 (BBASS) 0.761 -1.120 .233 - 0.132 -1. 429 .155 
E4 (LS TAY) 10. 773 0.918 .635 - 5.833 -3.447 .001 
Dl (ACCR) 7.737 0.479 .639 0.756 0.324 • 746 
D2 (MEDSCH) [+] - 34.845 -0.264 .789 [+] - 4.850 -0.258 0 793 
D3 (BCROSS) [+] - 60.628 -Ll45 .256 [ +] - 7.700 -1.005 • 320 
D4 (MEDCRE) [+] - 64.218 -L071 .289 [+] -10.461 -1. 220 .225 
PM (PM) [-] 7.294 0. 307 • 758 [-] 1.114 0.325 • 745 
L/K (PNLSIZ) 260.300 8.850 .000+ 38.463 9.104 .000+ 
p (DWAGE) 26.197 6.904 .000+ 3.802 6.914 .000+ 
x (COMPT) 2.948 0.939 .646 0.755 1.699 .091 
*Where the algebraic signs of regression coefficients are different from expected signs, the expected 
signs are indicated in brackets. -....] w 
the additional controls and review of production by third 
parties such as medical school faculty, the Blue Cross 
Association, and Medicare personnel, enhances not only the 
quality of production in hospitals but also enhances the 
efficiency of production. The conflicting signs for the 
coefficients of OHS, XRT, and EMR may be explained by 
undetected interaction between these high-cost facilities 
and other hospital characteristics and facilities. It is 
not reasonable to assume, for instance, that open-heart 
surgery facilities (OHS) tend to reduce average cost as 
indicated by its negative coefficients. 
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The central hypothesis of this study, that more intense 
competition results in higher average cost, finds some sup-
port in these results. Such support is quite weak in the 
case of the average cost of an admission (CPAD) but rather 
strong in the case of the average cost of a day of patient 
care (CPPD). In the latter instance, the test statistic is 
not quite significant by usual criteria. However, this sta-
tistic and the sign of the coefficient of COMPT indicate 
that the intensity of competition has a positive impact on 
average cost. 
Partial joint tests of the hypothesis that all 48 
independent variables were not important in explaining the 
variation in average cost produced significant "F" ratios. 1 
1when CPAD is the dependent variable, F = 14.83078 and 
when CPPD is the dependent variable, F = 10.17718. 
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This gives support to the assumption that some of the 
model's 48 regressors are important in explaining the behav-
ior of CPAD and CPPD. But, of course, an inspection of the 
multiple regression coefficients and their test statistics 
also supports that assumption. 
Sequential Model C0nstruction Results: 
"Forward Selection" and 
"Stepwise" Procedures 
Both forms of the model were fitted to the data using 
the s. A. s. Forward Selection and Stepwise regression rou-
tines. These resulted in substantial reductions in the num-
ber of regressors in both forms of the model. 
When CPAD was the regressand, the resulting models 
contained twenty regressors found by the Forward Selection 
procedure and eight by the Stepwise procedure. The results 
are summarized in Table IV. It is interesting to note the 
modest loss of the explanatory power of these "smaller" 
models in comparison with the "complete" model containing 
all 48 independent variables. There exist similar conflicts 
regarding.these results and a priori expectations of the 
algebraic signs of some of the multiple regression coeffi-
cients as in the case when all independent variables were 
regressed. In the Forward Selection results, the signs of 
the coefficients of MEDSCH, MEDCRE, XRT, and EMR again con-
flict with expectations; in the Stepwise results, the signs 
of the coefficients of MEDCRE and EMR conflict with expected 
signs. 
TABLE IV 
REGRESSION RESULTS: FORWARD SELECTION AND STEPWISE REGRESSION 
PROCEDURES FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE CPAD* 
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Variables found Coefficients t-Scores for Probability of 
by procedure (b values) H : 
0 
b = 0 a greater !ti 
Fo:rward Selection Procedure, R2: .91149 
Intercept 120.593 
Ql (ADMD) 1.062 - 1.178 • 240 
M2 (RESI) 98.165 2.081 • 038 
M4 (NURSE) 52.768 2 .110 • 036 
M7 (ICCU) [ +] - 13. 790 - 1.564 .118 
MlO (PTP) 11.990 1.183 .238 
Mll (XRT) [ +] - 44. 735 - 2.674 .009 
Ml4 (DRD) 34. 301 2.337 .021 
M29 (PSYE) 37.888 1.976 .048 
M30 (OPD) 43.487 2.821 .006 
M31 (EMR) [ +] - 25. 313 - 1. 889 .059 
M34 (HAX) [-] 13.458 1.443 .149 
El (ORATE) l.400 - 1.318 .188 
E2 (ADBED) - -7. 909 - 4.026 .ooo+ 
E3 (BBASS) 1.166 - 2.864 .005 
E4 (LSTAY) 9 .071 .951 .654 
D2 (MEDSCH) [ +] - 85.416 - 1. 704 .088 
D4 (MEDCRE) [ +] - 78.281 - 2.308 .022 
L/K (PNLSIZ) 243.520 13. 536 .000+ 
p (DWAGE) 29.993 11.954 .ooo+ 
x (COMPT) 4.255 1.992 • 04 7 
Stepwise Procedure, R2: .88904 
Intercept 193. 553 
Ml4 (DRD) 25. 727 2.106 .035 
M31 (EMR) [+] - 27.245 - 2.047 .041 
E2 (ADBED) - 10.288 -17.627 .ooo+ 
E3 (BBASS) 1.251 - 3.120 • 003 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
Variables found Coefficients t-Scores for 
by procedure (b values) H : b = 0 0 
04 (MEDCRE) [+] - 66.360 - 2.129 
L/K (PNLSIZ) 233.614 15.864 
p (DWAGE) 27.226 12.293 
x (COMPT) 4. 348 2.306 
*Expected signs are indicated in brackets. 
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Probability of 
a greater It I 
.034 
.ooo+ 
.000+ 
.022 
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The study's hypothesis gains considerable support from 
the results of these analyses. The coefficient of COMPT is 
positive in both models and is statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level in both. This is a substantial gain in 
support over the barely suggestive results of the regression 
of the "complete" model on CPAD. Given the modest loss in 
R2 between these models and the 48 variable model, there is 
some confirmation that irrelevant variables were eliminated 
with these procedures. 
Partial joint tests of the hypothesis that the 
coefficients of deleted variables were not different from 
zero produced "F" statistics that were not significant. 2 
The hypothesis, therefore, was accepted. There may be some 
question regarding the importance of the variables deleted 
from the Forward Selection results by the Stepwise routine. 
A partial joint test was performed and the calculated "F" 
statistic was not quite significant at the 5 percent level 
indicating that the deleted regressors might not be impor-
tant in explaining the behavior of CPAD, i.e., that the 
2For the Forward Selection model, 
= (.92466-.91149) 7 28 = 
F ( 1-. 92466) 7 ( lo 7-48-1) • 36208; 
and in the Stepwise model, 
(. 92466-. 88904) 7 40 
F = (1-.92466) 7 (107-48-1) = .68588. 
"smaller" model is "better. 113 This test is appropriate in 
this instance as all the regressors found by the Stepwise 
routine were also found by the Forward Selection routine. 
If, however, the "smaller" model had regressors not in the 
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"larger" model, this partial joint test would not be appro-
priate. 
When the Forward Selection and Stepwise routines were 
performed with CPPD as the dependent variable, the resulting 
models contained 23 and 8 independent variables respectively. 
These results ·appear in Table V. Again, there are conflicts 
between the results and the expected signs of some of the 
regression coefficients. 
The magnitudes, signs, and test statistics of the 
coefficients of COMPT in both resulting models offer strong 
evidence in support of the studys central hypothesis. The 
level of significance for the coefficient of COMPT is 
2.32 percent in the Forward Selection model and 0.12 percent 
in the Stepwise model. These results are even more encourag-
ing given the very small loss in explanatory power of these 
models from that of the regression of the "complete" model. 
The results of the partial joint tests justify these 
3 
= (.91149-.88904) -;- 12 = 
F (l-.9ll49) -;- (l07-20-l) 1. 81790 • 
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TABLE V 
REGRESSION RESULTS: FORWARD SELECTION AND STEPWISE PROCEDURES 
FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE CPPD* 
Variables found Coefficients t-Scores for Probability of 
by procedure (b values) H : b = 0 a greater ltl 
0 
Forward Selection Procedure, R2: .87925 
Intercept 81.725 
Ml (CANCER) 7.781 1.629 .103 
MS (RECOV) - 2.601 - 6.696 .090 
M6 (ICU) 3.172 1.920 .055 
M7 (ICCU) [+] - 0.813 - 0.616 .553 
MB (OHS) [ +] - 6.525 - 1.671 .095 
Mll (XRT) [ +] - 6.558 - 2. 775 .007 
Ml4 (DRD) 4.813 2.184 .030 
Ml6 (PATH) 3.125 1.427 .154 
Ml7 (BLBK) - 1.900 - 1. 333 .183 
M21 (SCU) - 4.795 - 1. 575 .115 
M23 (PHTH) 0.378 0.225 • 817 
M27 (REHO) [+] - 5.268 - 1.136 .258 
M30 (OPD) 4.837 2.173 .031 
M31 (EMR) [+] - 4. 893 - 2.533 .003 
El (ORATE) - 0.409 - 2.636 .009 
E2 (ADBED) - o. 879 - 3.134 .003 
E3 (BBASS) - 0.183 - 3.133 .003 
E4 (LSTAY) - 5 0 771 - 4.201 .000+ 
03 (BCROSS) [+] - 8.198 - 1.280 .201 
04 (ME:DCRE) [+] -11.607 - 2.192 .029 
L/K (PNLSIZ) 36. 361 11. 392 .000+ 
p (DWAGE) 3.974 11. 727 .ooo+ 
x (COMPT) o. 715 2.288 .023 
Stepwise Procedure, R2: • 83983 
Intercept 55.413 
El (ORATE) .338 - 2.365 .019 
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TABLE V (Continued) 
Variables found Coefficients t-Scores for Probability of 
by procedure (b values) H : b = 0 a greater ltl 
0 
E2 (ADBED) .817 - 3.087 .003 
E3 (BBASS) .173 - 2a981 .004 
E4 (LSTAY) - 5. 268 - 4.015 .000+ 
M31 (EMR) [+] - 4.384 - 2a333 .026 
L/K (PNLSIZ) 33.179 14.203 .ooo+ 
p (DWAGE) 3.927 12.597 .ooo+ 
x (COMPT) .940 3.436 .001 
*Expected signs are indicated in brackets. 
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reductions in the numbers of independent variables. 4 It was 
again found that it was appropriate to test the hypothesis 
that the coefficients of the regressors deleted from the 
Forward Selection model by the Stepwise model are irrelevant 
in explaining the behavior of the dependent variable. In 
this instance, the "F" statistic was just significant at the 
5 percent level and the hypothesis was rejected. 5 
These results strongly support the study's central 
hypothesis and offer substantial justification for restrict-
ing the analysis to models containing fewer than the 48 
independent variables indicated in Equation (2). However, 
no attempt is made to select "best" models other than to 
imply that the "best" models contain fewer than 48 regres-
sors. 
4For the Forward Selection model, 
(. 89387-. 87925) -.- 25 
.31960; F = (1-.89387) (107-48-1) = -.-
and for the Stepwise model, 
(. 89 387-. 839 83) -.- 40 
.73833. F = (1-.89387) (107-48-l) = 
5 
F = (.87925-.83983) + 15 = 1.80643. (1-.87925) (107-23-l) 
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Sequential Model Construction Results: 
The "Maximum R2 Improvement" 
Technique 
Both versions of the model were fitted to the data 
using the s. A. s. Maximum R2 Improvement technique. Since 
there was evidence that COMPT was important in very "small" 
as well as in "larger" models in explaining the variation in 
average cost, it is desirable to observe the behavior of the 
coefficient of COMPT and its test statistics in models con-
taining various numbers of independent variables. There is 
little reason to be concerned with models containing large 
numbers of regressors given the results and tests of other 
regression procedures. Therefore, the Maximum R2 procedure 
was terminated after all regressions on from 1 through 30 
independent variables were computed for both versions of the 
model. An abbreviated sununary of these results is given in 
Table VI. The sign of the coefficient of COMPT was uni-
formly positive whenever COMPT appeared as an important 
variable "found" by the procedure. Since the purpose of 
this procedure is only to develop further argument concern-
ing the study's central hypothesis, the other variables 
"found" by Maximum R2 Improvement are not presented in 
Table VI. Therefore, only the R2 statistics for each model 
and the coefficients of COMPT, their t-scores, and their 
significance levels are furnished in Table VI. 
In the case where CPAD is the dependent variable, when 
COMPT first appears in a model, its coefficient is positive 
84 
TABLE VI 
REGRESSION RESULTS: MAXIMUM R2 IMPROVEMENT TECHNIQUE 
Number of Coefficient of 
variables 
R2 
COMPT t-Scores for Prob. of a 
in m:,del (b values) H . b = 0 greater ltl . 0 
Dependent Variable CPAD 
1 . 31909 
2 .51825 
3 .86012 
4 • 86771 
5 .87538 
6 .88016 4.408 2.280 .023 
7 • 88429 4.386 2.297 .022 
8 • 88904 4. 348 2.306 .022 
9 • 89111 4. 320 2.301 .022 
10 • 89467 4.154 2.235 .026 
11 • 89748 4.107 2.228 . 027 
12 .89986 3.358 1. 779 .075 
13 .90159 2.938 1.538 .123 
14 • 90358 3.222 1. 716 .086 
15 .90496 3.296 1. 757 .079 
16 .90675 3.311 1.586 .112 
17 .90844 3.525 1.689 .091 
18 .90962 3. 724 1. 779 .075 
19 .91056 3.902 1. 856 .064 
20 .91149 4.255 1.992 .047 
21 .91279 2.983 1.388 .165 
22 • 91389 2 .874 1. 336 .182 
23 .91475 3.186 1.461 .144 
24 .91557 2. 831 1.276 .203 
25 .91688 3.034 1. 374 .170 
26 • 91778 3.338 1.495 .135 
27 • 91841 3.585 1.585 .113 
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TABLE VI (Continued) 
Number of Coefficient of 
variables COMPT t-Scores for Prob. of a 
in model R2 (b values) H : b = 0 greater ltl 0 
28 .91904 3.186 1. 371 .171 
29 • 91960 3.614 1.504 .133 
30 .92050 2.824 1.188 .237 
Dependent Variable CPPD 
1 . 33025 
2 .53369 
3 • 76776 
4 .78415 0.838 2.783 .007 
5 • 79887 o. 841 2.878 .005 
6 .82512 0.875 3.114 .003 
7 .83315 0.887 3.214 .002 
8 • 83983 0.940 3.436 .001 
9 .84405 0.928 3.418 .001 
10 .84760 0.907 3.358 .002 
11 0 85364 0 .879 3.280 .002 
12 • 85767 o. 884 3. 328 .002 
13 • 86035 0.828 3.089 • 003 
14 • 86356 0. 760 2.815 .006 
15 .86560 0. 714 2.622 .010 
16 , 86913 0.907 3.018 .004 
17 • 87139 0.901 3.009 .004 
18 0 87346 0.872 2.908 .005 
19 .87528 0.867 2. 896 .005 
20 • 87666 0.894 2.973 .004 
21 • 87826 0.895 2.955 .004 
22 .88009 0.894 2.959 .004 
23 • 88119 0.884 2. 840 .006 
24 • 88242 o. 861 2.758 .007 
25 .88445 o. 749 2.382 .019 
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TABLE VI (Continued) 
Number of Coefficient of 
variables COMPT t-Scores for Prob. of a 
in model R2 (b values) H : b = 0 greater ltl 0 
26 • 88571 o. 758 2.408 .017 
27 .88695 0.689 2.165 .031 
28 .88814 0.699 2.194 .029 
29 • 88933 0.676 2.113 .036 
30 .88980 0.696 2.152 .033 
87 
and statistically significant and remains so through 5 
additional models (6 through 11 independent variables); it 
does not become statistically significant again until the 
20-variable model although it remains positive throughout. 
It is interesting to note that the 8 and 20 variable models 
found with this technique are the identical models found by 
the Stepwise and the Forward Selection procedures. Even 
though the coefficient of COMPT was not statistically sig-
nificant in any larger models, COMPT was included as one of 
the "important" variables in all larger models found by the 
Maximum R2 Improvement technique (until, of course, the rou-
tine was terminated at 30 independent variables). The posi-
tive sign of the coefficients of COMPT and the behavior of 
the tests of statistical significance again provide substan-
tial argument in support of the study's central hypothesis. 
In the case where CPPD is the dependent variable, COMPT 
enters the Maximum R2 routine with the 4 variable model. 
The coefficient of COMPT is statistically significant at the 
1.0 percent level and remains so through the 24 variable 
model. In the remaining 25 through 30 variable models, the 
significance level never rises to as much as 4.0 percent. 
The 8 variable model found by Maximum R2 is identical to 
that found by Stepwise; the 23 variable model, however, is 
a little different from that found by Forward Selection. 
Maximum R2 eliminated ICCU, PHTH, and REHO from the Forward 
Selection model and substituted RDT, PREM, and ECEP. This 
change raised R2 from .87925 to .88119. Otherwise, the 
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models are identical. There hardly needs be comment 
regarding the support these results give the study's 
hypothesis. The signs, magnitudes, and test statistics of 
the coefficient of COMPT in all models larger than three 
independent variables are powerful supporting argument. 
The Maximum R2 Improvement technique first chose COMPT 
to enter the 6-variable model for the dependent variable 
CPAD, and the 4-variable model for the dependent variable 
CPPD. Partial joint tests were performed regarding the 
addition of COMPT at these points in the Maximum R2 
routines. 6 The resulting "F" statistics were significant 
in both instances indicating that the addition of COMPT to 
these very "small" models added little to the explanatory 
power of the regressions. These results conflict with the 
test statistics on the coefficient of COMPT in both 
instances, however. This test does offer some contrary 
argument regarding the study's hypothesis. 
6When CPAD is the dependent variable, 
= (.88016-.87538) + 1 = 
F (1-.88016) + (107-6-1) 3 · 98865 ; 
and when CPPD is the dependent variable, 
= (.78415-.76776) + 1 = 
F (l-. 78415) -.- (107-4-l) 7 • 74538 · 
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Regression Results: Tests for 
Interactions 
The quadratic form of COMPT and the other seven 
interaction variables were added to the set of independent 
variables in both forms of Equation (2) • 7 These larger sets 
of independent variables were analyzed by means of the For-
ward Selection, Stepwise, and Maximum R2 Improvement step-
wise regression procedures. For these purposes, the Maximum 
R2 routine was terminated after the 20-variable model was 
found and fit. 
In the case where CPAD was the dependent variable, none 
of the above stepwise regression procedures selected COMPT 
or its quadratic form for any model. However, the inter-
action of COMPT and BBASS (CM_BS) appeared uniformly in all 
but the models containing fewer than six independent vari-
ables. Where BBASS was selected, its coefficient was sig-
nificant and was negative as expected but the interaction 
variable, CM_BS, had a positive coefficient that was statis-
tically significant whenever it appeared. These results are 
summarized in Tables VII and VIII. In the Forward Selection 
results and in the Maximum R2 results beginning with the 
13-variable model, another interaction variable, COMPT with 
ADMD (CM_AM), appears in the models. Its coefficient is 
uniformly negative and statistically significant in all 
7The identification of the interaction variables is 
given above, p. 61. 
TABLE VII 
REGRESSION RESULTS: TESTS FOR INTERACTIONS, 
FORWARD SELECTION AND STEPWISE PROCEDURES 
FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE CPAD* 
Variables found Coefficients t-Scores for 
by procedure (b values) H : b = 0 
0 
Forward Selection Procedure, R2: .91638 
Intercept 183.086 
Ql (ADMD) [-] 0.292 0.275 
M2 (RESI) 53.602 1.829 
M4 (NURSE) 64.239 2.471 
MS (RECOV) - 12.473 - 1.189 
M6 (ICU) 17 .650 1.617 
M7 (ICCU) [+]- 8.167 - 0.912 
Mll (XRT) [+]- 48. 932 - 2.901 
M14 (DRD) 33.519 2.216 
M22 (EXCU) [+]- 21.535 - 1.093 
M29 (PSYE) 43.582 2.197 
M30 (OPD) 30. 093 2.050 
M31 (EMR) [+]- 28.521 - 2.146 
M33 (HAX) [-] 10.466 1.126 
El (ORATE) 1.055 - 1.031 
E2 (ADBED) 7.855 - 4.086 
E3 (BBASS) 1.855 - 3.786 
E4 (LSTAY) 6.549 0.707 
04 (MEDCRE) [+]- 98. 390 - 2.916 
L/K (PNLSIZ) 228.892 12.334 
p (DWAGE) 27.020 11.676 
CM AM o. 331 - 2.228 
CM BS 0.198 2.694 
Stepwise Procedure, R2: • 890986 
Intercept 198.281 
M14 (DRD) 29.493 2.459 
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Probability of 
a greater ltl 
. 780 
.068 
.015 
• 236 
.106 
.633 
.005 
.028 
.277 
.029 
.041 
.033 
.262 
• 306 
.ooo+ 
.ooo+ 
.512 
.005 
.000+ 
.000+ 
.027 
.008 
.015 
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TABLE VII (Continued) 
Variables found Coefficients t-Scores for Probability of 
by procedure (b values) H : b = 0 a greater !ti 0 
M31 (EMR) [+]- 28.690 - 2.172 .030 
E2 (ADBED) - 10.091 -17.165 .000+ 
E3 (BBASS) 1.551 - 3.608 .001 
04 (MEDCRE) [+]- 69.561 - 2.248 .025 
L/K (PNLSIZ) 231.499 15.755 .ooo+ 
p (DWAGE) 27.363 12.518 .ooo+ 
CM BS 0.112 2.654 .009 
*Expected signs are indicated in brackets. 
Number of 
variables 
in model 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
TABLE VIII 
REGRESSION RESULTS~ TESTS FOR INTERACTIONS, MAXIMUM R2 IMPROVEMENT 
PROCEDURE FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE CPAD 
Competition and 
interaction 
variables found Coefficients t-Scores for 
R2 by procedure (b values) H : b = 0 
0 
• 31909 
.51825 
• 86012 
0 86771 
.87538 
.88086 CM BS 0.105 2e412 
e 88543 CM BS 0.108 2.511 
.88841 CM BS 0.105 2o470 
. 89334 CM BS OellO 2.623 
.89614 CM BS 0.106 2e536 
e 89930 CM BS 0.110 2.662 
.90210 CM BS 0.097 2.320 
.90468 (CM AM -0.282 -2.255 
CM_BS 0.197 3.002 
.90787 (CM AM -0.281 -2.273 
CM_BS 0.197 3.034 
Probability of 
a greater ltl 
.017 
e013 
.015 
.009 
.012 
.009 
.021 
.025) 
.004 
0 024) 
.004 
~ 
Iv 
TABLE VIII (Continued) 
Competition and 
Number of interaction 
variables 
R2 
variables found Coefficients t-Scores for Probability of 
in model by procedure (b values) H : b = 0 a greater ltl 
0 
15 .90966 (CM AM -0.292 -2.366 .019) 
CM_BS 0.200 3.086 .003 
16 e 91140 [CM AM -0.318 -2.555 .012) 
CM_BS 0.207 3.206 .002 
17 • 91301 (CM AM -0. 317 -2.560 .012) 
CM_BS 0.195 2.999 .004 
18 .91447 (CM AM -0.312 -2.527 .013) 
CM_BS 0.194 2.983 .004 
19 .91547 (CM AM -0. 328 -2.634 .010) 
CM_BS 0.198 3.047 .003 
20 .91614 (CM AM -0.325 -2.604 .011) 
CM_BS 0.195 2.990 .004 
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models. Whenever these two interactions appear together in 
a model, the impact of COMPT on average cost can only be 
determined on a hospital-by-hospital basis with actual values 
for BBASS and ADMD. If, however, one chooses mean values 
for BBASS (23.37) and ADMD (9.72), it can be shown that COMPT 
has a positive impact on average cost in all models whether 
CM BS appears alone or with CM AM. 
Where CPPD was the dependent variable, the procedures 
selected COMPT alone, in combination with its quadratic form, 
and in various combinations with other interaction variables 
as well as selecting only interaction variables in various 
models. These results are summarized in Tables IX and x. 
Two interaction variables with negative coefficients, COMPT 
with LSTAY (CM_LS) and COMPT with PNLSIZ (CM_PZ), appear in 
combination with COMPT or in combination with other inter-
action variables in three different models, the Forward 
Selection model and the,5- and 6-variable Maximum R2 models. 
Again, there are problems regarding the measurement of the 
impact of COMPT on average cost. But as before, if one 
chooses mean values for ORATE (67.07), LSTAY (6.92), and 
PNLSIZ (1.61), it can be shown that COMPT has a positive 
impact on average cost in all models. 
These results add some support for the study's 
hypothesis that is developed above. In particular, the 
results of the tests for interactions for the dependent 
variable CPPD add yet stronger supporting argument in that 
the Maximum R2 procedure (Table X), even with eight more 
TABLE IX 
REGRESSION RESULTS: TESTS FOR INTERACTIONS, 
FORWARD SELECTION AND STEPWISE PROCEDURES 
FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE CPPD* 
Variables found Coefficients t-Scores for 
by procedure (b values) Ho: b = 0 
Foxward Selection Procedure, R2: .87394 
Intercept 71. 980 
M7 (ICCU) [+] - 1. 423 - 1.144 
Mll (XRT) [ +] - 4.902 - 2.245 
M14 (DRD) 3.570 1. 747 
M29 (PSYE) 5. 718 1.801 
M30 (OPD) 3.823 1.800 
M31 (EMR) [+] - 3.588 - 1. 852 
M33 (HAX) [-] 1.931 1.393 
El (ORATE) - 0.270 - 1.631 
E2 (ADBED) - 1. 045 - 3. 489 
E3 (BBASS) - 0.155 - 2.587 
E4 (LS TAY) - 6.365 - 4.469 
Dl (ACCR) [+] - 2.241 - 1. 296 
D4 (MEDCRE) [+] - 8.915 - 1. 731 
L/K (PNLSIZ) 34.050 12.764 
p (DWAGE) 4.013 10. 714 
x (COMPT) 6.967 2.878 
COM 2 - 0 .193 - 1.113 
CM PZ - 0,449 - 0.780 
CM LS - 0.528 - 2.235 
Stepwise Procedure, R2: • 84 705 
Intercept 58.900 
M31 (EMR) [ +] - 4.048 - 2.405 
El (ORATE) - o. 341 - 2 .431 
E2 (ADBED) - 0.801 - 3. 080 
E3 (BBASS) - 0.176 - 3.085 
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Probability of 
a greater ltl 
.254 
.026 
.080 
• 072 
.072 
.064 
.164 
.103 
.001 
.011 
.ooo+ 
.198 
.083 
.ooo+ 
.000+ 
.005 
.268 
.556 
.026 
.017 
.016 
• 003 
.003 
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TABLE IX (continued) 
Variables found coefficients t-Scores fer Probability of 
by procedure (b "1alues) H 
0 
: b = 0 a greater It! 
E4 (LSTAY) - 5.388 - 4.177 .ooo+ 
L/K (PNLSIZ) 32.645 14.143 .ooo+ 
p (DWAGE) 3. 743 11. 767 .ooo+ 
x (COMPT) 4.048 2.740 .007 
COM 2 - 0.341 - 2.140 .033 
*Expected signs are indicated in brackets. 
Number of 
variables 
in model 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
TABLE X 
REGRESSION RESULTS~ TESTS FOR INTERACTIONS, MAXIMUM R2 IMPROVEMENT 
PROCEDURE FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE CPPD 
Competition and 
interaction 
R2 
variables found Coefficients t-Scores for 
by procedure (b values) H : b = 0 
0 
.33025 
053369 
• 76776 
.78415 x (COMPT) 00838 20783 
0 80380 (X (COMPT) 4c678 3.768 
CM PZ -L830 -3cl80 
c81433 (CM_OR Oc054 3.475 
CM PZ -L693 -2.882 
• 83402 CM AB 0.021 3c 302 
084125 CM AB 0.021 3c430 
c84498 CM AB 00020 3.172 
c84846 CM AB 0.020 3.194 
085221 CM AB Oc020 3.169 
c 85778 CM AB 0.020 3c 341 
086067 CM AB 0.019 3.127 
• 86372 CM DW 00053 20835 
Probability of 
a greater !ti 
.007 
. 001) 
.002 
0001) 
.005 
.002 
cOOl 
c002 
0002 
.002 
c002 
.003 
0006 I.D 
-..J 
TABLE X (Continued) 
Competition and 
Number of interaction 
variables 
R2 
variables found Coefficients 
iri model by procedure (b values) 
15 0 86564 CM r:»l 0.050 
16 .86913 x (COMPT) 0.907 
17 0 8714 7 CM DW 0.064 
18 • 87346 x (COMPT) Oo872 
19 • 87528 x (COMPT) 0.867 
20 0 87666 x (COMPT) 00894 
t-Scores for 
H : b "" 0 0 
2.628 
3.018 
30018 
2.908 
2. 896 
2.973 
Probability of 
a greater !ti 
0009 
0004 
.004 
.005 
.005 
.004 
\0 
co 
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variables to select from, found several models that are 
identical to previous results. It is, however, unknown what 
might be the extent or importance of untested interactions 
among independent variables in Equation (2). 
This section has tested for and found statistically 
significant interactions between the variable COMPT and 
other determinants of average cost. The results are in sub-
stantial agreement with the results of the other analyses. 
Results of a Factor Analysis of the 
Determinants of Average Cost 
The independent variables specified in Equation (2) 
were subjected to a factor analysis to gain some insights 
regarding the groupings of those variables to represent 
(1) hospital output, (2) the multiproduct nature of output, 
(3) the efficiency of production, (4) the quality of output, 
and other determinants of average cost. The S. A. S. Factor 
procedure was instructed to limit the number of factors to 
eight. This number is a bit arbitrary but seemed adequate 
given the categories in Equation (2). 
The "rotated factor matrix" from the output of the 
s. A. s. Factor procedure is used in the analysis developed 
here. After being factored, all independent variables in 
Equation (2) were assigned to particular factors on the 
criterion that the variable had its highest "factor loading" 
(or correlation) with a particular factor. These results 
are given in Table XI. 
Factor 1 
Factor 2 
TABLE XI 
RESULTS OF A FACTOR ANALYSIS OF THE 
DETERMINANTS OF AVERAGE COST* 
Variables 
Ql (ADMD) 
(Q ) 2 (ADM _2) 1 
Q2 (CENSUS) 
(Q ) 2 (CEN_2) 2 
M2 (RESI) 
M3 (INTERN) 
M4 (NURSE) 
MB (OHS) 
Mll (XRT) 
Ml2 (CBT) 
Ml3 (RDT) 
Ml4 (DRD) 
Ml5 (TRD) 
Ml8 (ECEP) 
M23 (RENI) 
M24 (RENO) 
M26 (OCTH) 
M28 (PSYI) 
D2 (MEDSCH) 
MS (RECOV) 
M6 (ICU) 
Mg (FTP) 
Ml6 (PATH) 
Ml7 (BLBK) 
Ml9 (IHTH) 
M20 (PREM) 
M25 (PHTH) 
M29 (PSYE) 
100 
Factor Loadings 
• 75 
. 84 
.78 
.85 
. 84 
.84 
• 43 
.68 
• 72 
• 80 
. 80 
.54 
.84 
.48 
.78 
• 72 
.54 
.66 
• 81 
• 59 
.60 
.64 
.66 
• 36 
• 75 
.49 
.75 
.37 
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TABLE XI (Continued) 
Variables Factor Loadings 
Factor 2 (Continued) M33 (HAX) .42 
L/K (PNLSIZ) .59 
M22 (EXCU) .4 7 
El (ORATE) -.65 
E2 (AOBEO) -.82 
Factor 3 
E3 (BBASS) -.53 
E4 (LSTAY) .47 
x (COMPT) - .43 
M7 (ICCU) .59 
M21 (SCU) .55 
Factor 4 M30 (OPO) .57 
M31 (EMR) .43 
M34 (VLS) .54 
PM -.57 
Factor 5 
04 (MEDCRE) • 84 
Ml (CANCER). • 79 
Factor 6 M27 (REHO) .69 
M32 (SWO) .57 
01 (ACCR) -.63 
Factor 7 p (DWAGE) -.56 
Factor 8 MlO (PTP) -.63 
03 (BCROSS) .42 
*All factor loadings are from the rotated factor matrix of the 
analysis. 
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Meaningful identification of factors from the results 
of a factor analysis is not always possible. However, the 
results presented in Table XI are readily identified in the 
cases of factors 1, 2, 3, and 4 and are identified more 
tentatively in the cases of the other factors. Factors 1, 
2, 4, and 6 can be said to represent the multiproduct nature 
of hospital output. Factor 1 represents output associated 
with large hospitals with large admissions and patient popu-
lations, i.e., high output hospitals; factor 2 represents 
basic services and staffing; factor 4 might be outpatient 
and emergency services; and factor 6 might represent that 
hospital output that is associated with seriously ill or 
injured patients requiring long recuperation times. Factor 3 
is, of course, the efficiency of hospital output and factors 
5, 7, and 8 can be interpreted as representing the quality of 
hospital output. 
Given the rather small number of hospitals in the set 
of observations, these results offer remarkable justifica-
tion for the rather subjective criteria applied to group the 
independent variables in Equation (2) to represent the 
determinants of average cost detailed in Equation (1). The 
theoretical soundness of the cost relationship is reinforced 
by these results. 
Summary 
This chapter has presented the results of the analysis 
of the data and the test of the study's central hypothesis. 
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The multiple regression analyses and the associated 
sequential methods developed or "found" several models or 
cost prediction equations that explained substantial propor-
tions of the variation in the average cost of hospital output 
with considerably fewer independent variables than those 
specified in Equation (2). These smaller or more compact 
models almost always contained the dependent variable COMPT 
that represented the degree or intensity of competition, the 
subject of interest in this study. The multiple regression 
coefficient for COMPT estimated by these procedures was uni-
formly positive and this positive sign was consistent with 
the study's central hypothesis. And the tests of statisti-
cal significance on the coefficient of COMPT indicate that 
it is an "important" variable in explaining the behavior of 
average cost. The results of the factor analyses of the 
determinants of average cost justify the formulation and 
specification of the cost function described by Equation (1) 
and the statistical model described by Equation (2). 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, 
AND IMPLICATIONS 
Introduction 
The first section of this chapter sununarizes the 
findings and discusses the conclusions derived from the 
preceding empirical chapter. The results of the analyses 
and tests are compared with the central hypothesis and the 
purpose of the study. This section also includes some dis-
cussion regarding the usefulness of the smaller models found 
by the sequential model construction methods to predict 
average cost of production in hospitals. The last section 
of the chapter discusses the implications of the findings 
and the need for further investigation suggested by the 
study. 
Sununary and Conclusions 
It was mentioned in Chapter IV that both linear and 
quadratic forms of the measures of output were included in 
Equation (2) in order to test the assumption of the "U" 
shapedness of the resulting average cost curves. In the few 
models where either ADMD or CENSUS were in the sets of 
regressors, the signs of their coefficients were negative, 
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io5 
indicating economies of size. The quadratic forms of the 
measures of output never appeared without the linear mea-
sures also being in the sets of regressors. In the analyses 
discussed here, this occurred only in the 48 regressor 
models. It is noted in the CPAD results that the coeffi-
cient of ADMD is negative and that the coefficient of ADM 2 
is positive; in the CPPD model the coefficient of CENSUS is 
negative and the coefficient of CEN 2 is positive. 1 These 
results define a "U" shaped average cost curve with respect 
to output. None of these coefficients are statistically 
significant at even the 50 percent level. Using the CPPD 
results and assuming that all other regressors and their 
coefficients are constants, the derivative of average cost 
(CPPD) with respect to output (CENSUS) is: 
dd(~i~~~~) = .00005 (CENSUS) - .039. 
Setting this derivative equal to zero and solving for CENSUS 
at the minimum value of CPPD yields: 
CENSUS - .o 39 
.00005 = 780, 
indicating that minimum average cost is not reached until 
very large daily patient census counts are reached. Similar 
conclusions are obtained with the CPAD model. These results 
indicate that economies of size exist in this industry 
1see Table III, pp. 71-73. 
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through very large hospitals. However, the levels of 
significance associated with output variables degrade this 
conclusion. 
There is considerable discussion in earlier chapters 
concerning the effects of profit incentives on the average 
cost of hospital output. The literature argues that costs 
should be lower in for-profit hospitals. This study argues 
that responses of hospitals to satisfy the wants of their 
physician-customers will be similar in either for-profit or 
in nonprofit hospitals. The profit motive variable appeared 
only in the 48 independent variable models. Its coefficient 
was positive in both models but was not statistically sig-
nificant in either. 2 These results provide weak support for 
this study's argument. 
The results of the analyses of the 48 variable models 
specified in Equation (2) were only suggestive regarding the 
hypothesized effect of competition on average cost. How-
ever, it was not expected that analyses of such cumbersome 
equations would have resulted in support for the hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, the analysis of the model with CPPD as the 
dependent variable produced a coefficient for COMPT that was 
positive and with a significance level of less than 10 per-
cent. The results with CPAD as the dependent variable were 
not nearly so suggestive; the coefficient of COMPT was posi-
tive but with a significance level of only 65 percent. 3 
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The sequential model construction methods employed to 
reduce the number of independent variables found a number of 
models that were more amenable to analysis. The analyses of 
these models produced rather overwhelming support for the 
study's hypothesis. Whenever COMPT was selected as one of 
the independent variables in these models, its coefficient 
was uniformly positive and statistically significant in most. 
The Forward Selection procedure found 20 variables for 
the CPAD model and 23 variables for the CPPD model. The 
coefficient of COMPT was 4.255 in the CPAD model and 0.715 
in the CPPD model. These coefficients were significant at 
the .047 and the .023 levels respectively. 4 This indicates 
that an additional competitor in a market adds about $4.26 
to an admission and about $.72 to a day of care in hospitals 
in that market. Each of these results is in reasonable 
agreement with the other. The Stepwise procedure found 
eight variables for both the CPAD and the CPPD versions. 
The coefficients of COMPT were 4.348 and 0.940 with signifi-
cance levels of .022 and .001 for CPAD and CPPD respec-
tively.5 Again, the results are consistent one with the 
other. To compare the coefficients in the CPPD models to 
those in the CPAD models requires that the mean value.of 
"length of stay" (6.9 days) be used as a multiplier for the 
coefficients in the CPPD models. This produces values that 
4see Tables IV d V 76 d 80 an , pp.. an • , 
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are different from the coefficients in the CPAD models. 
These differences are quite modest when the standard errors 
of the coefficients and the standard deviation of the mean 
of LSTAY are considered. The magnitudes of the coefficients 
of COMPT indicate that even small numbers of competitors in 
a market would cause average cost to be substantially 
higher. 
The Maximum R2 Improvement technique found all 1 through 
30 independent variable models that were "best" models based 
on the criterion of producing the highest R2 values. In the 
1 to 5 independent variable models with CPAD as the depen-
dent variable, Maximum R2 did not select COMPT but included 
it thereafter through the 30 variable model. The statistical 
significance of the coefficient of COMPT remained below 
3 percent from the 6 through the 11 variable model. In the 
other 13 through 30 variable models, the significance level 
ranged from a little less than 8 percent to a little over 
24 percent with the exception of the 20 variable where the 
significance dropped to less than 5 percent. 6 The Maximum 
R2 results with CPPD as the dependent variable selected 
COMPT beginning with the 4 variable model and included it in 
all subsequent models. The coefficient was significant at 
the 1 percent level through the 24 variable model and the 
6see Table VI, pp. 84-86. 
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significance level never rose to as much as 4 percent through 
the 30 variable model. 7 
The conclusions derived from these results are that 
higher degrees of or more intense competition in the hospital 
industry results in higher average cost of production. 
These conclusions do not depend on the particular measure 
of output selected by the investigator. These results indi-
cate that the study's central hypothesis can be accepted and 
that the purpose of the study is satisfied. 
The conclusions arising from the tests for interactions 
between COMPT and other variables are discussed in Chapter v. 
There was, however, a secondary purpose of the test pro-
cedures that was not discussed in detail there. Included in 
the set of interaction variables to be tested was the quad-
ratic form of COMPT (COM_2}. The secondary purpose for 
including this term was to attempt to discern some "optimal 
intensity of competition." COM 2 was selected only in the 
Forward Selection and the Stepwise results of the inter-
action tests for the CPPD model. 8 In the Forward Selection 
results, COMPT, COM_2, and two interaction terms, CM LS and 
CM_PZ, were selected along with 14 other variables. 9 This 
model can be formulated as: 
7Ibid. 
8see Table X, pp. 97-98. 
9Ibid. 
CPPD = 6.967 (COMPT) - .528(CM_LS) - .449(CM_PZ) 
- .193(COM_2) + (the intercept term, the 
other 14 variables, and their coefficients). 
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If the last term is assumed to be a constant, the derivative 
of CPPD with respect to COMPT is: 
dd(Jg~~~ = 6.967 - .528 (LSTAY) - .449 (PNLSIZ) 
- • 386 ( COMPT} • 
Substituting their mean values (6.9 and 1.6) for LSTAY and 
PNLSIZ and combining terms, this can be rewritten: 
d (CPPD) = 2.606 - .386 (COMPT). d (COMPT) 
From an inspection of this derivative, we know that the 
second derivative will be negative for any value of COMPT 
and also know that CPPD will be at a maximum when the 
derivative equals zero0 Setting the derivative equal to 
zero and solving for the maximum value of CPPD yields: 
COMPT = 2.606 
.386 = 6. 751. 
In the Stepwise results, COMPT and COM 2 were selected along 
with 7 other variables. 10 The coefficient of COMPT was 
4.048 and the coefficient of COM 2 was -.341. The deriva-
tive of CPPD with respect to COMPT in this model is: 
lOibid. 
d (CPPD) = 4.048 - .341 (COMPT). d (COMPT) 
Setting the derivative equal to zero and solving for the 
maximum value of CPPD yields: 
COMPT 4.048 = 
.341 = 11.871. 
These results indicate that the "optimum intensity of 
competition" in Oklahoma hospital markets would be either 
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"very few" or "very many" competitors. And since there are 
no hospital markets in the state with more than 10 competi-
tors, it is likely that the optimum is 11 few 11 rather than 
"many. 11 
The results of the factor analysis of the determinants 
of the average cost of hospital care gave considerable sup-
port to the theoretical soundness of the formulation of the 
average cost relationship. Additionally, the R21 s result-
ing from the analyses imply that many of the models "found" 
by the stepwise techniques are useful in predicting the 
average cost of individual hospitals. The derivation of 
useful prediction equations is not the object of this study. 
Nevertheless, some further evaluation of the usefulness of 
these models in prediction is valuable. The useful model 
would be that which predicts accurately and precisely. In 
other words, that model where the confidence limits of its 
predictions were "compact" and the model's biases were not 
"excessive" would be a useful prediction model. It is 
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discussed in Chapter IV that if regressors are excluded from 
a multiple regression model and the true values of their 
coefficients are not zero, bias is introduced. If, how-
ever, their true values are zero, the variance statistic of 
the least squares estimates is reduced. 11 The error mean 
square is an estimate of the variance of a model. In the 
Maximum R2 results for the CPPD model, it was possible to 
observe the behavior of the error mean square (EMS) statis-
tic. In the models where COMPT was selected, EMS fell from 
50.596 in the 4 variable model to 34.108 in the 25 variable 
model. EMS then rose to 34.667 in the 30 variable model and 
to 43.751 in the "complete" 48 variable model. In the 25 
independent variable model where EMS reaches a minimum value, 
the "width" of the confidence intervals for individual pre-
dictions also reaches a minimum. On this criterion, the 
25 regressor model was selected as the "best" prediction 
equation. The results of the analysis of this model are 
compared with the results of the analysis of the 48 regres-
sor model. 
The s. A. s. Regression procedure has options that 
produce for each observation (1) the observed value of the 
dependent variable, (2) the value predicted by the model, 
(3) the residual, and (4) the upper and lower 95 percent 
f ' d 1' 't 12 con 1 ence 1m1 s. These limits are based on an 
11Rao, pp. 37-38. 
12service, pp. 94-98. 
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individual value of CPPD corresponding to the values of the 
regressors in each observation. In the "complete" 48 regres-
sor model with an EMS of 43.751, a single observed value 
fell outside the 95 percent confidence limits. In the 25 
regressor model where the EMS reached a minimum of 34.108, 
the same single observed value fell outside the 95 percent 
confidence limits. The R2 statistic for the 48 regressor 
model is .89387 and .88445 for the 25 regressor model indi-
cating less than a 1 percent loss in explanatory power by 
the elimination of 23 independent variables. These results 
indicate that there are useful models with fewer than 48 
regressors that can predict the average cost of individual 
hospitals with a high degree of accuracy and precision. It 
is interesting to note that the multiple regression coeffi-
cient associated with COMPT is statistically significant at 
the 2 percent level in the 25 regressor modei. 13 
The conclusions that are derived from the results of 
the analyses summarized here are that the formulation and 
specification of the model described by Equation (2) is 
theoretically sound and that it predicts average cost of 
individual hospitals satisfactorily; however, "restricted" 
models found by sequential model construction methods may be 
better predictors than the 48 regressor "unrestricted" 
models. The analyses of the 48 regressor models indicated 
that average cost curves were "U" shaped but that the output 
13see Table VI, p. 84. 
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variables indicating this characteristic were not relevant 
in explaining the variation in average cost. The degree or 
intensity of competition is an important determinant of aver-
age cost and the direction of its impact is in agreement 
with the study's hypothesis. The importance of COMPT is most 
apparent in the models found by the stepwise regression tech-
niques where the number of regressors is restricted. The 
restricted models are better models in that the partial 
joint tests indicate that irrelevant regressors were elimi-
nated. 
Implications of the Study 
This study indicates that, in the state of Oklahoma, 
competition among hospitals for physicians is a cause of 
hospital cost inflation. This study has not discerned the 
precise responses of hospitals that increase their costs. 
Further research is needed concerning the relationship 
between the degree or intensity of competition and the par-
ticular responses of hospitals to attract physicians. No 
consideration has been given in this study to hospital poli-
cies regarding medical staff privileges or to hospital poli-
cies regarding the mechanisms through which medical staff 
express their wants. Such policies should be important con-
siderations in further investigations. The scope of this 
study has been limited to a single state; any implications 
suggested here regarding other states or the nation as a 
whole require that the study's scope be expanded. 
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The analytical results of the study offer support for 
the assumption regarding the expected behavior of hospitals 
to respond to their physician-customers more intensely in 
competitive than in monopoly markets. If more substantial 
support is developed for the indication that economies 
accrue to high-capacity units, large regional hospitals or 
medical centers operating under, say, a "public utility" 
franchising arrangement would appear to be one solution to 
eliminate some of the inflationary pressures originating 
from physicians. 
A more general solution would be to provide appropriate 
incentives for physicians to produce therapies using least-
cost combinations of medical inputs. However, insured 
patients might not purchase least-cost therapies unless less 
costly alternative medical goods and services are as 
intensely insured as is hospital care. Therefore, some 
restructuring of health-care insurance would appear to be 
a prerequisite to the provision of such incentives. Health 
Maintenance Organizations (HMO's) have been suggested as a 
possible solution as they incorporate many of the above 
features. HMO subscribers generally have insurance-type 
coverages for most all medical goods and services rather 
than the usual hospital-only coverages. Physicians associ-
ated with HMO's are paid whether or not subscribers want or 
require medical care. There is usually an incentive for 
physicians to select least-cost combinations of medical 
inputs in producing therapies in that the "profits" of the 
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HMO and the physician are higher if, for instance, a 
subscriber is not admitted to a hospital when treatment as 
an outpatient is a satisfactory alternative. If the hospi-
tal is owned or controlled by the HMO, there will be cost 
savings in the production of hospital care associated with 
such efficient resource allocation. If, however, the hospi-
tal used by HMO physicians is independent of the HMO, it is 
unlikely that its expected response to other physicians will 
be much changed. 
These implications suggest that a rather radical 
reformation of the medical care industry and the associated 
health care insurance industry may be required in order to 
reduce or even rationalize hospital cost inflation. The 
term "rationalize" is used in the sense of reducing the 
demand for and the subsequent inflation in the hospital 
industry and increasing the demand for less costly substitute 
medical goods and services. Any proposal for a "National 
Health Service" to provide either medical care or health 
care insurance for all citizens must avoid perverse incen-
tives that exist in the present medical care industry. 
Otherwise, continued increases in the cost of hospital care 
will result. 
The suggestions for further research and the 
implications of the study discussed here are not complete. 
The contrary signs of the multiple regression coefficients 
of, for instance, open-heart surgery facilities (OHS) and 
diagnostic radioisotope facilities (DRD) require further 
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study. The delimitation of relevant markets for hospitals 
also requires additional work. The suggestive implications 
regarding the effects of the profit incentive on hospital 
costs may only be a result of the small sample that is 
restricted to a particular geographic area. Other readers 
will likely see the need for additional research and draw 
different implications from the study's results. Neverthe-
less, the empirical results and the implications are in 
substantial agreement with the central hypothesis. 
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LISTING AND IDENTIFICATION OF VARIABLES 
Variable 
Names from 
Equation C 2) 
c 
01 
02 
co ) 2 1 
co ) 2 2 
C/01 
C/02 
AND THEIR ABBREVIATIONS* 
Abbreviations 
TCOST 
PCOST 
PERNL 
BEDS 
BASS 
BIRTHS 
ADM 
ADMD 
CENSUS 
ADM 2 
CEN 2 
CPAD 
CPPD 
ORATE 
Identification 
Annual total expenditures 
for a hospital. 
Annual personnel expendi-
tures for a hospital. 
Average full-time equiva-
lent employees in a hospi-
tal. · 
Number of adult and pedi-
atric beds in a hospital. 
Number of bassinets in 
newborn nursery. 
Annual live births. 
Annual admissions. 
Daily admissions CADM/365). 
Average daily patient 
census. 
Average cost; cost per 
admission CTCOST/ADMD). 
Average cost; cost per day 
of patient care CTCOST/ 
[CENSUS x 365]). 
· Occupancy rate (CENSUS/ 
BEDS) • 
*Each instance where characteristics of hospitals 
enter the model as zero-one (dummy) variables is indicated 
in the Identification column in this listing. 
Variable 
Names from 
Equation ( 2) 
E2 
PM 
L/K 
p 
x 
Abbreviations 
ADBED 
BBASS 
LS TAY 
ACCR 
MEDSCH 
BC ROSS 
MEDCRE 
PM 
PNLSIZ 
DWAGE 
COMPT 
Identification 
Admissions per bed 
(ADM/BEDS) • 
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Births per bassinet (BIRTHS/ 
BASS) • 
Length of stay. 
Accreditation by either the 
American Hospital Associ-
ation or by the American 
Osteopathic Associat~on 
(one if accredited, zero if 
not). 
Affiliation with an approved 
school of medicine (one if 
affiliated, zero if not). 
Approved for reimbursement 
by Blue Cross plans (one if 
approved, zero if not). 
Approved for reimbursement 
by the Medicare program 
(one if approved, zero if 
not) • 
Hospital organized as a 
profit-making institution 
(one if for profit, zero if 
not). 
Labor to capital ratio 
(PERNL/[BEDS +BASS]). 
Wage rate; daily personnel 
expenditures per full-time 
equivalent employee (PCOST/ 
[PERNL x 365]) • 
Degree or intensity of 
competition; the number of 
competitors for each hos-
pital. 
Variable 
Names from 
Equation (2) 
Ml 
Abbreviations 
CANCER 
RESI 
INTERN 
NURSE 
RECOV 
ICU 
ICCU 
OHS 
FTP 
PTP 
XRT 
CBT 
ROT 
ORD 
TRD 
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Identification 
Cancer program approved by 
the American College of 
Surgeons (one if hospital 
has program, service, or 
facility~ zero if not). 
AMA approved residency 
training program (one, 
zero) • 
AMA approved internship 
program (one, zero). 
Hospital-controlled 
professional school of 
nursing (one, zero). 
Postoperative recovery 
room (one, zero). 
Intensive care unit (one, 
zero) • 
Intensive c·ardiac care unit 
(one, zero) . 
Open-heart surgery facility 
(one, zero) • 
Pharmacy with a full-time 
pharmacist (one,, zero). 
Pharmacy with a part-time 
pharmacist (one, zero). 
X-ray therapy facility (one 
zero) . 
Cobalt therapy facility 
(one, zero) • 
Radium therapy facility 
(one, zero). 
Diagnostic radioisotope 
facility (one, zero). 
Therapeutic radioisotope 
facility (one, zero). 
variable 
Names from 
Equation (2) 
Ml6 
Abbreviations 
PATH 
BLBB 
ECEP 
IHTH 
PREM 
EXCU 
scu 
REN! 
RENO 
PHTH 
OCTH 
REHO 
PSYI 
PSYE 
OPD 
EMR 
SWD 
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Identification 
Histopathology laboratory 
(one, zero} • 
Blood bank (one, zero}. 
Electroencephalography 
service· (one, zero}. 
Inhalation therapy depart-
ment (one, zero}. 
Premature newborn nursery 
(one, zero}. 
Extended care unit attached 
to hospital (one, zero}. 
Self-care unit (one, zero}. 
Inpatient renal dialysis 
(one, zero} . 
Outpatient renal dialysis 
(one, zero}. 
Physical therapy department 
(one, zero}. 
Occupational therapy depart-
ment (one, zero}. 
Outpatient rehabilitation 
unit (one, zero}. 
Inpatient psychiatric 
Services (one, zero}. 
Emergency psychiatric 
services (one, zero}. 
Organized outpatient 
department (one, zero}. 
Emergency department (one, 
zero} • 
Social work department 
(one, zero} • 
Variable 
Names from 
Equation (2) 
M33 
Abbreviations 
HAX 
VLS 
Identification 
Hospital auxiliary (one, 
zero) . 
Volunteer services 
department (one, zero). 
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